Critical Race IP by Keller, Deidre
Florida A&M University College of Law 
Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law 
Journal Publications Faculty Works 
2018 
Critical Race IP 
Deidre Keller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.law.famu.edu/faculty-research 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898 







DEIDRÉ A. KELLER 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... 736 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 737 
I. WHY CRITICAL RACE IP ................................................................ 743 
A. The Rise of the Intellectual Property Economy ................ 746 
B. From CLS to Critical IP ................................................... 752 
II. LOCATING CRITICAL RACE IP....................................................... 755 
A. What is the “Race” in Critical Race IP? ......................... 759 
B. What is the “IP” in Critical Race IP? .............................. 762 
C. (Un)bounding Critical Race IP ........................................ 764 
1. Storytelling as Critical Race IP Praxis ....................... 767 
2. Protecting Traditional Knowledge ............................. 769 
3. The Public Domain ..................................................... 771 
4. Framing and Reframing “Piracy” and 
“Counterfeiting”........................................................ 772 
5. Access to Knowledge ................................................. 774 
6. Remaking Intellectual Properties ............................... 776 
 

Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part 
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use, 
subject only to the condition that the names of the authors, a complete citation, and this copyright 
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies. 

Assistant Professor of Communication and African and African Diaspora Studies at Boston 
College and Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, by courtesy. I wish to 
thank the American Association of University Women and UC Davis School of Law for 
supporting my research during the 2016–2017 year. I would also like to thank the many sponsors 
of Race + IP 2017, a conference without which this article would be much less rich.  

Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, Claude W. Pettit College of Law. We would like 
to thank the many people who generously provided their input on this this essay, including 
Maggie Chon, Lisa Ikemoto, Minh-Ha T. Pham, Rich Schur, and Darrel Wanzer-Serrano. We are 
grateful to research assistants, Brittney Ciarlo (ONU Law 2018) and Garrett Robinson (ONU Law 
2019) for all of the help they provided and to Shelly Shockency for administrative assistance. The 
name Critical Race IP came out of a conversation that the authors and Laura Foster had at a 
writing retreat at Indiana University in the spring of 2014. The conference came to fruition after 
several attempts at funding, with multiple sets of colleagues. While we have worked with a 
number of individuals, this Article represents only the views of the authors. We do not speak for 
any of the individuals with whom we have collaborated. Any errors or omissions are our own. We 
are grateful for the community of extraordinary scholars that has expressed interest in and support 
for Critical Race IP as an intellectual project and subject of a conference for sharing their 
compelling and important ideas. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898 
KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2018  6:00 PM 
736 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 36:3 
III. ALL WE HAVE IS EACH OTHER: COMMUNITY BUILDING AND 
PUBLIC FEELINGS IN CRITICAL RACE IP ................................. 777 
A. CRT as Intimate Practice ................................................. 781 
B. Critical Race IP as Community Building and Intimacy 
Making ............................................................................ 784 
IV. CRITICAL RACE IP AS DECOLONIZING PRAXIS ............................ 787 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 794 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, written on the heels of Race + IP 2017, a 
conference we co-organized with Amit Basole1 and Jessica Silbey,2 we 
propose and articulate a theoretical framework for an interdisciplinary 
movement that we call Critical Race Intellectual Property (Critical Race 
IP).3 Specifically, we argue that given trends toward maximalist 
intellectual property policy, it is now more important than ever to study 
the racial investments and implications of the laws of copyright, 
trademark, patent, right of publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition 
in a manner that draws upon Critical Race Theory (CRT). Situating our 
argument in a historical context, we articulate the provisional 
boundaries and core ideological commitments that define Critical Race 
IP, particularly in contrast with Critical Intellectual Property. After 
exploring the landscape of this developing area of study through its 
central themes, we draw upon scholarship on public feelings to 
demonstrate the importance of community building and intimacy-
making practices in the growth of Critical Race IP. Public feelings are 
an implicit and often under-theorized aspect of intellectual property law 
that comes to the forefront in engagements with race and colonialism. 
We conclude with a discussion of Critical Race IP as decolonizing 
praxis that can aid in anti-racist and anti-colonial struggles. 
Race enters writing and the making of art, as a structure of feeling, as 
something that structures feelings, that lays down tracks of affection 
and repulsion, rage and hurt, desire and ache. These tracks don’t only 
occur in the making of art; they also occur (sometimes viciously, 
sometimes hazily) in the reception of creative work. Here we are 
again: we’ve made this thing and we’ve sent it out into the world for 
recognition—and because what we’ve made is in essence a field of 
human experience created for other humans, the field and its maker 
and its readers are thus subject all over again to race and its 
 
1
 Associate Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University.  
2
 Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law, Innovation, and Creativity (CLIC) at 
Northeastern University School of Law. 
3
-Anjali Vats, Deidré Keller, Amit Basole & Jessica Silbey, RACE + IP, 
http://raceipconference.org/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017); see also infra Introduction.  
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infiltrations. In that moment arise all sorts of possible hearings and 




[I]ntimacy . . . involves an aspiration for a narrative about something 
shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a 
particular way. Usually, this story is set within zones of familiarity 
and comfort . . . animated by expressive and emancipating kinds of 
love. Yet the inwardness of the intimate is met by a corresponding 
publicness. People consent to trust their desire for ‘a life’ to 
institutions of intimacy; and it is hoped that the relations formed 
within those frames will turn out beautifully, lasting over the 




In April 2017, Boston College hosted the inaugural Race + IP 
conference.6 The collaborative work of an organizing committee 
consisting of the authors of this Article, Amit Basole, and Jessica 
Silbey,7 Race + IP 2017 brought together scholars from around the 
world and across disciplines for what the organizers intended to be 
generative discussions of issues and questions at the intersections of 
race, colonialism, and intellectual property.8 This is the first of what we 
hope will be many pieces prompted and informed by those discussions. 
In this piece, we explore and articulate the interdisciplinary movement 
of Critical Race Intellectual Property (Critical Race IP). 9 
Race + IP 2017 was the outcome of many years of thought, 
research, and discussion on the part of the authors, often in 
collaboration with other scholars—such as Laura Foster,10 Rayvon 
Fouché11 and Lateef Mtima12—who work at the intersections of race 
 
4
Claudia Rankine & Beth Loffreda, On Whiteness and the Racial Imaginary, LITERARY HUB 
(April 9, 2015), https://lithub.com/on-whiteness-and-the-racial-imaginary.  
5
Lauren Berlant, Intimacy: A Special Issue, 24 CRITICAL INQUIRY 281 (1998).  
6




Anjali Vats, Deidré Keller, Amit Basole & Jessica Silbey, Schedule, RACE + IP, 
http://raceipconference.org/conference-schedule/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017). 
9
Here, we take a page from Cultural Studies, which has been termed an “interdisciplinary 
movement” and a “network.” See Richard Johnson, What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?, 16 SOC. 
TEXT 38 (1986). Unlike many Cultural Studies scholars, we argue for “academic codification” in 
this Article. See Tony Bennett, Cultural Studies: A Reluctant Discipline, 12 CULTURAL STUD. 
528, 533 (citing Johnson and noting, “The concerns that inform [Johnson] . . . and there are many 
[similar concerns expressed] in the literature—are clear enough. Cultural studies, having accused 
other humanities disciplines of ‘fixing’ knowledge into particular intellectual and institutional 
frameworks, must fight shy of both institutionalization and codification if it is not simply to 
become just another discipline of the kind it had earlier pitched itself against.”). 
10
Laura Foster, IND. U. BLOOMINGTON, https://genderstudies.indiana.edu/about/faculty/foster-
laura.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2017). 
11
Rayvon Fouché, PURDUE U., 
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and intellectual property. We introduce Race + IP 2017 here to offer 
context for the conversations that are occurring in Critical Race IP. As 
in Critical Race Theory (CRT), histories of the interdisciplinary study of 
race, particularly those that center on scholars of color, are an important 
part of the intellectual project. Our work, therefore, both tells a story of 
a developing field of study and highlights the work of scholars in the 
area.13 Our aim is to examine the intersections and divergences among 
CRT, Critical Intellectual Property, and Critical Race IP. We begin, as 
we must, given that CRT is foundational to our enterprise, with a brief 
foray into that area. 
Devon Carbado recently wrote an article entitled “Critical What 
What?” in which he traced one version of the genesis story, histories, 
boundaries, and future of CRT.14 He recounts: 
When my colleagues and I proposed the establishment of a Critical 
Race Studies specialization at UCLA School of Law more than a 
decade ago, the only push back we got was over the name. Why 
Critical Race Studies? Why not Civil Rights? Race and the Law? 
Anti-Discrimination Studies?. . . . [T]he episode suggested that there 
was something in and about the name. By any other name, our 
faculty meeting on the matter would have been considerably shorter. 
. . . This should not lead one to conclude that the ‘Critical what 
what?’ question is only about the name. The query is about the 
whatness (or, less charitably, the ‘there there’) of CRT as well. What 
is the genesis of CRT? What are the core ideas? What are its goals 
and aspirations? What intellectual work does the theory perform 
outside of legal discourse? What are the limitations of the theory? 
What is its future trajectory?
15
 
As many scholars before us have argued, CRT is a rich, diverse, 
and nuanced interdisciplinary movement, bound together by shared 
tenets and goals related to the racial non-neutrality of law.16 Broadly 
speaking, CRT evolved as a response to Critical Legal Studies (CLS),17 
 
https://cla.purdue.edu/academic/sis/directory/index.aspx?p=Rayvon_Fouch%C3%A9 (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2017). 
12
Lateef Mtima, HOW. U., http://law.howard.edu/faculty-staff/lateef-mtima (last visited Oct. 9, 
2017). 
13
As part of the Conference, we have been building a Critical Race IP reading list to offer an in-
depth look at those works which define and inform the subfield. A copy of that list will be 
available at: Critical Race IP Reading List, www.raceipconference.org/readinglist (forthcoming 
2018). 
14
Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593 (2011).  
15
Id. at 1595. 
16
See, e.g., Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus 
Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARVARD EDUC. REV. 659 (2009). 
17
See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas, Introduction to 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxii (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future 
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and it functions as a move to center questions of race and racialization, 
in intersectional ways, while CLS had focused primarily on class and 
power.18 At the same time, CRT aims to make progressive interventions 
in the existing law and scholarship of antidiscrimination, particularly 
while centering the voices of people of color.19 
Over the last twenty-five years, CRT has grown from the project of 
a small group of scholars in legal academia to a transdisciplinary project 
for conceptualizing the many ways that state and cultural apparatuses 
protect the privileges of whiteness at the expense of people of color.20 
While always retaining its core identity as a critique of law in theory 
and practice, its intersectional, race-centered analysis informs the work 
of scholars across disciplines and defines the vocabulary of popular 
cultural social justice discussions.21 As Carbado stresses, it is imperative 
that “we conceptualize CRT as a verb,”22 as in the practice of critical 
race theorizing, reading it as a dynamic area of study with evolving 
meanings, boundaries, and scope. Just as CRT has evolved temporally, 
as we have moved from the post-Civil Rights era into the purported 
post-racial era,23 it has also evolved in its content. As Francisco Valdes, 
Jerome McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris write about CRT at the 
turn of the century: “For a small band of scholars whose ideas are set 
out in multisyllabic words and who travel with armies of footnotes, 
 
Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 356 
(2006). 
18
See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 




See, e.g., Arild Buanes & Svein Jentoft, Building bridges: Institutional perspectives on 
interdisciplinarity, 41 FUTURES 446 (2009); Imani Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory 
and Some Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REV. 915 (2005). On transdisciplinarity generally, 
see Marilyn Stember, Advancing the social sciences through the interdisciplinary enterprise, 28 
SOC. SCI. J. 1 (1991). 
21
See, e.g., Christine Emba, Intersectionality, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/21/intersectionality-a-
primer/?utm_term=.36cdd414474f (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“Over the past several years 
‘intersectionality’ has become a feminist buzzword, deployed in discussions of pop culture, 
political action and academic debate. Considering its recent prominence, it’s surprising to realize 
that the term has been around only since 1989—it was coined by legal scholar and critical theorist 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, in a paper illustrating how black women were often marginalized by both 
feminist and anti-racist movements because their concerns did not fit comfortably within either 
group.”); see also Clare Foran, Hillary Clinton’s Intersectional Politics, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/hillary-clinton-
intersectionality/472872 (“Clinton’s invocation of intersectionality may also broaden popular 
understanding of the concept. In popular culture, it has been variously deployed. Intersectionality 
has been denounced by conservatives as a form of identity politics. Progressives, meanwhile, 
have used the term both to conceptualize identity and as a framework to broadly explain how 
different structural barriers operate simultaneously. Clinton is using the concept to denote an 
integrated approach to dealing with deeply-intertwined environmental, economic, and social 
problems.”). 
22
Carbado, supra note 14, at 1602. 
23
See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009). 
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CRT has had, as noted at the outset, an extraordinary impact on popular 
as well as on legal discourse.”24 
We invoke Carbado’s work specifically to introduce another 
“Critical What What”—namely Critical Race IP.25 Critical Race IP, as 
we define it, refers to the interdisciplinary movement of scholars 
connected by their focus on the racial and colonial non-neutrality of the 
laws of copyright, patent, trademark, right of publicity, trade secret, and 
unfair competition using principles informed by CRT.26 The 
groundbreaking work of legal scholars such as Keith Aoki,27 Rosemary 
Coombe,28 Margaret Chon,29 Kevin J. Greene,30 Madhavi Sunder,31 
Anupam Chander,32 Olufunmilayo Arewa,33 Ruth Okediji,34 and 
others35 tackles questions regarding the racial and neo-colonial 
inequality that intellectual property law produces in contexts such as 
trade and development, music, film, and traditional knowledge (TK). 
We articulate a framework that reads these works together, as a body of 
scholarship with shared tenets about the racialized hierarchies inherent 
in IP law and its attendant ordering of knowledge. We do not mean to 
suggest that these scholars employ the same methods or make the same 
critiques, only that they are tied together by a set of assumptions about 
intellectual property law, including that it operates to protect the power 
 
24
Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris, Introduction to CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 1 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). 
25
We shy away from the perhaps obvious acronym “CrIP” because of the use of the term “crip” 
in the context of disability studies to reclaim the power of the differently-abled body. See, e.g., 
ROBERT MCRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY (2006). 
26
Anjali Vats, Deidré Keller, Amit Basole & Jessica Silbey, CFP, RACE + IP, 
http://raceipconference.org/call-for-papers/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017) (“Broadly considered, 
critical race IP brings together two strands of scholarship: critical race theory and IP. Scholarship 
in critical race IP, which engages a variety of topics and texts, focuses on questions which 
thematically examine the relationship between race and racial formation and the study of 
copyrights, trademarks, patents, rights of publicity and trade secrets. Issues such as the 
trademarking of #BlackLivesMatter, the creation of race-based patents, the deployment of 
rhetorics of piracy demonstrate that race and IP intersect in important and complex ways.”). 
27
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural 
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
28
See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998). 
29
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2821 (2006). 
30
See, e.g., K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over 
African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008). 
31
See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP
3
, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
32
See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 1331 (2004). 
33
See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and 
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277 (2006). 
34
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Africa and the Global Intellectual Property System: Beyond the 
Agency Model, 12 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 207 (2004). 
35
This list is not exhaustive, only exemplary. We have selected these works as representative of 
the type of race and intellectual property scholarship that confronts the hegemony of the law and 
economics framework and pushes for critiques of its assumptions and implications.  
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of whiteness and the Global North. We proceed by asking a series of 
questions about Critical Race IP, particularly related to its necessity, 
purpose, investments, scope, relationships to anti-racist and anti-
colonial activism, and possible future directions. 
What is Critical Race IP? Why is it necessary? Whose work does it 
build upon and whose work does it describe? How and where is it 
emerging? What are its central themes? Where are its boundaries? How 
might it inform the work of anti-racist and anti-colonialist activists? In 
asking these questions, we do not profess to assign scholars labels or 
dictate who may identify as a “Race IP Crit.”36 Rather, our hope is to 
engage in a conversation about the area, its relationship to CRT and 
Critical IP, as well as its potential futures. We believe it is imperative to 
continue to consider the relationship between post-Fordism, the 
economic system marked by “flexible accumulation”37 rather than 
standardized industrial mass production as a panacea for economic 
growth, and a means of reconstructing racial and neo-colonial 
hierarchies in the evolving contexts of intellectual property law.38 We 
also believe, as Sunder argues in her scathing critique of the law and 
economics approach to intellectual property law, “law must facilitate 
the ability of all citizens, rich or poor, brown or white, man or woman, 
straight or gay, to participate in making knowledge of our world and to 
benefit materially from their cultural production.”39 
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, “Why Critical Race 
IP?”, we identify some historical contexts and motivating impulses 
behind Critical Race IP. We trace the sociopolitical and economic 
 
36
 We use the term Race IP Crit to both invoke the notion of the Race Crit, i.e. a scholar who 
identifies as part of the CRT community, and highlight our addition of an intellectual property 
element to that critical race posture. For an example of the invocation of the term Race Crit, see 
Valdes et al., supra note 24 at 33.  
37
See Martha Macdonald, Post-Fordism and the Flexibility Debate, 36 STUD. POL. ECON. 177, 
177 (1991) (“Essentially, the debate surrounding post-fordism/flexibility has to do with the way 
firms, industries and indeed national economies and world capitalism are restructuring in this era 
of technological change, heightened international competition and rapidly changing markets. 
Whereas the post-war period is characterized as one of mass production/consumption, planning, 
control and stability, the current age, it is argued, requires flexibility and rapid response to change 
by capital, and hence by labour.”); see also Bob Jessop, Post-Fordism and the State, in 
COMPARATIVE WELFARE SYSTEMS: THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL IN A PERIOD OF CHANGE 165 
(Bent Greve ed., 1996); E Schoenberger, From Fordism to Flexible Accumulation: Technology, 
Competitive Strategies, and International Location, 6 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 245 
(1988); see generally DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO 
THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1989) (discussion of postmodernism and the transition to 
post-Fordism); MICHEL AGLIETTA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION: THE US 
EXPERIENCE 122–30 (2000). 
38
See generally POST-FORDISM: A READER (Ash Amin ed., 200); Keith Aoki, Considering 
Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, 
“Global” Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 457 
(1998). 
39
See MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 23 (2012). 
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conditions that gave rise to the scholarship focusing on race, social 
justice, and intellectual property, as well as the reasons that articulating 
a Critical Race IP is increasingly important. A central focus of this 
section is exploring the relationship between CRT, Critical Race IP, and 
Critical IP, a field of study that John Tehranian defines as concerned 
with intellectual property law and power.40 In parsing the relationships 
among those three areas, we turn to the debates which preceded and 
resulted in the emergence of CRT after the development of CLS in the 
1970s and 1980s for context. Part II, “The What What of Critical Race 
IP,” explores some important themes in Critical Race IP, examining 
how scholars across disciplines read intellectual property’s lack of race 
neutrality and the tenets that inform their analyses. In particular, we 
explore how the “race” in Critical Race IP is both consonant with and 
diverges from the “race” in CRT. We also define “intellectual property,” 
the body of laws that Critical Race IP engages. Conversations at Race + 
IP 2017 come to the fore in this section as we locate some provisional 
boundaries of Critical Race IP as well as the its ideological 
commitments, which include reading across categories such as race, 
ethnicity, national identity, and neo-coloniality in intersectional ways in 
order to reveal intellectual property law’s racial investments in 
whiteness and continuing implications for racial (in)equality. 
In Part III, “All We Have is Each Other: Community Building and 
Public Feelings in Critical Race IP,” we explore the role of community 
building in the development of the study of race and intellectual 
property. We draw upon CRT’s formative workshops and commitment 
to engagement with public feelings to consider the centrality of 
relationships in building new professional and public sensibilities 
around Critical Race IP. In short, we posit that a Critical Race IP lens 
can help create greater anti-racist and social justice consciousness, thus 
informing the work of scholars, practitioners, and activists. 
Finally, Part IV, “Critical Race IP as Decolonizing Praxis,” 
investigates why and how the study of Critical Race IP can offer 
insights not only into addressing the racial bias of intellectual property 
law which informs systems of ownership, circulation, and distribution 
of knowledge, but also highlights new avenues for anti-racist and anti-
colonial struggle.41 Crystallizing a set of tenets which define and 
 
40
See John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control, 
2012 BYU L. REV. 1233, 1243–44 (2012) (“I refer to this body of work as ‘critical IP theory,’ 
which I loosely define as the deconstruction of trademark, copyright, and patent laws and norms 
in light of existing power relationships to better understand the role of intellectual property in 
both maintaining and perpetuating social hierarchy and subordination.”). 
41
See, e.g., Bonita Lawrence & Enakshi Dua, Decolonizing Anti-Racism, 32 SOC. JUS. 120 
(2005); see also Nandita Sharma & Cynthia Wright, Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging 
Colonial States, 35 SOC. JUS. 120 (2009). We are aware of the tensions between anti-racist and 
anti-colonial discourse. We do not intend to elide those tensions but do recognize that a full 
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animate Critical Race IP helps us to understand how some scholars 
approach the study of the complex connections between race and 
knowledge production, and how we might undo those racially 
inequitable connections. We close with a discussion of decolonizing 
Critical Race IP, asserting that theories and practices of decolonization 
are productive for thinking about new approaches to addressing issues 
of race and social justice in intellectual property. 
I. WHY CRITICAL RACE IP 
Neither infringement nor Copyright Wars are new phenomena. 
Their repeated themes stretch back hundreds of years.42 William Patry 
argues that the most recent Copyright Wars occurred in 1998, “when 
copyright owners obtained from Congress unprecedented rights to 
control access to and use of their works.”43 With the radical changes 
brought by Betamax, VHS, the Internet, and Napster between the 1970s 
and 1990s, big content owners found themselves in deeply unfamiliar 
and rapidly shifting territory that impacted their core business models.44 
These technological developments which made copying, transforming, 
and remixing copyrighted and trademarked works easy for the average 
consumer fundamentally threatened the profits of entertainment 
industries that had previously held near monopolies on production and 
distribution in their respective markets.45 Similarly, technological 
changes ushered in by the era of biotechnology demanded legal and 
cultural responses.46 Negotiating the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in 1994 (TRIPS Agreement) 
 
engagement with those tensions is beyond the scope of this piece. Instead, we are intentionally 
seeking to articulate Critical Race IP as a space in which racialized and colonized persons can 
capitalize upon opportunities for solidarity. See discussion infra Part II.A, Part IV. On the 
potential for such solidarity in other contexts, see, e.g., Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández, 
Decolonization and the pedagogies of solidarity, 1 DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & 
SOC’Y 41 (2012). 
42
See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); see also ADRIAN 
JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010); 
PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC BATTLE 
(2014). 
43
See PATRY, supra note 42, at xix. 
44
See, e.g., id. at 8–9 (“Due to their push mentality, the copyright industries view the entirety of 
copyright as unidirectional: the public is a passive participant, whose role is simply to pay 
copyright owners, or stop using copyrighted works. As we shall now see, the record industry’s 
fanatical attachment to push marketing led them to miss and early and perhaps their best chance 
to take advantage of Internet pull marketing and to eliminate in the process a great deal of 
unauthorized file-sharing.”). 
45
See generally Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An 
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological 
Change, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 307 (1989); Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The 
Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009). 
46
See generally Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human 
Genetics, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383 (2010). 
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created an unprecedented global intellectual property regime,47 
compliance with which was encouraged, through more and less coercive 
means.48 Mark Getty of Getty Images,49 proclaimed that intellectual 
property is “the oil of the twenty-first century.”50 Though the accuracy 
of this statement is debatable,51 the argument for protecting that “oil” 
gathered (maximalist) steam.52 The global public response to these 
expansions of intellectual property rights was considerable. Pressure for 
free and open culture,53 critiques of biopiracy,54 adbusting and culture 
jamming campaigns,55 and large scale protests56 were some of the ways 
people pushed back against the rise of intellectual property maximalism. 
The economic conditions ushered in by the rise of the post-Fordist 
economy not only transformed intellectual property into an increasingly 
“precious commodit[y],”57—one which legal scholars almost 
exclusively theorized through the lens of law and economics58—they 
 
47
See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS 
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 104 
(2004) (citation omitted) (“TRIPS has been hailed as ‘the most far reaching and comprehensive 
legal regime ever concluded at the multinational level in the area of intellectual property 
rights.’”); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998); Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and 
Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 507 (1996). 
48
Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: Revisiting 
Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 191–92 (citations omitted) 
(“Built on the cornerstone of the ‘Great Conventions’ the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 
profoundly altered the nature, scope, and economic consequences of international intellectual 
property regulation.”).  
49
About Us, GETTY IMAGES, http://press.gettyimages.com/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) 
(describing Getty Images as “among the world’s leading creators and distributors of award-
winning still imagery, video, music and multimedia products,”). 
50
See Blood and oil, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2000), http://www.economist.com/node/288515#print. 
51
See Bruce Sterling, The Oil of the 21st Century Is, Uh, Oil, WIRED (Oct. 31, 2007, 7:19 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2007/10/the-oil-of-the/. 
52
See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and 
TTP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011). 
53
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
54
VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997); 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural Heritage and the 
Globalization of Intellectual Property, (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working 
Paper No. 04-19, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=596921. 
55
See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (Picador 2000); see also 
CHRISTINE HAROLD, OURSPACE: RESISTING THE CORPORATE CONTROL OF CULTURE (2007). 
56
WTO History Project, https://depts.washington.edu/wtohist/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017). 
57
Michael Mukasey, Attorney Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General 
Michael B. Mukasey at the Tech. Museum of Innovation (Mar. 28, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag_speech_080328.html. 
58
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1084 (1997); Peter 
S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 
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also marked an evolution in the racialized approaches to handling 
knowledge produced by people of color. We therefore situate the rise of 
intellectual property maximalism and “information feudalism”59 through 
the lenses of racial capitalism and neoliberalism, both of which are 
helpful in making race visible in a legal regime which purports to 
regulate knowledge production in race neutral ways. In invoking the 
term racial capitalism,60 we refer to the work of Cedric Robinson to 
understand how intellectual property’s economic structure is “always 
already” raced.61 As Robinson writes, “The historical development of 
world capitalism was influenced in a most fundamental way by the 
particularistic forces of racism and nationalism.”62 He continues: 
Racialism . . . ran deep in the bowels of Western culture, negating its 
varying social relations of production and distorting their inherent 
contradictions. The comprehension of the particular configuration of 
racist ideology and Western culture has to be pursued historically 
through successive eras of violent domination and social extraction 
that directly involved European peoples during the better part of two 
millennia. Racialism insinuated not only medieval, feudal, and 
capitalist social structures, forms of property, and modes of 
production, but as well the very values and traditions of 
consciousness through which the peoples of these ages came to 
understand their worlds and their experiences.
63
 
In essence, capitalism—an enterprise racialized at its core and 
inception64—progressed in ways which magnified and exacerbated the 
 
1600 129 (Boudewjin Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 2000). 
59
PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2007). 
60 CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION 9 
(2000). While we are aware of Nancy Leong’s article, Racial Capitalism, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2151 
(2013), we choose here to return to Robinson, whose work predates Leong’s and began a long 
conversation about the relationship between radical Blackness and Marxism. His groundbreaking 
work is being taken up in contemporary contexts today in ways we believe should be centered in 
thinking about intellectual property in particular. 
61
Here, we call upon Louis Althusser’s discussion of interpellation of subjects,  to argue that 
intellectual property law does not simply hail subjects but racial subjects under its racialized 
understandings of knowledge production, protection, and circulation. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, 
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2001); see also, RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY (Ian 
Haney López ed., 2007) (invoking Althusser in explaining the hailing of racialsubjects). 
62
For a discussion of neoliberalism, see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
(2007). In a recent interview in the Jacobin, Harvey explains: “I’ve always treated neoliberalism 
as a political project carried out by the corporate capitalist class as they felt intensely threatened 
both politically and economically towards the end of the 1960s into the 1970s. They desperately 
wanted to launch a political project that would curb the power of labor.” Bjarke Skaerlund 
Risager, Neoliberalism is a Political Project: An Interview with David Harvey, THE JACOBIN 
(July 23, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/david-harvey-neoliberalism-capitalism-
labor-crisis-resistance/. 
63
ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 66. 
64
See, e.g., EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE 
REMAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2014). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898 
KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2018  6:00 PM 
746 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 36:3 
racialization of intellectual property economies. The connection 
between race and intellectual property is certainly not new, but it has 
evolved with the coincident ascendance of the technology economy and 
intellectual property maximalism. We are not attempting to articulate 
the master narrative of race and intellectual property. Nor do we intend 
a comprehensive history of the decades before Critical Race IP 
scholarship began to take root. Rather, we wish to narrate, in broad 
strokes, an unfolding of events in which race, capitalism, and 
intellectual property set the stage for Critical Race IP, whose name and 
characteristic themes we elaborate upon in Part II of this article. 
A. The Rise of the Intellectual Property Economy 
Ash Amin writes that “there is an emerging consensus in the social 
sciences that the period since the mid-1970s represents a transition from 
one distinct phase of capitalist development to a new phase.”65 Whether 
described as “post-Fordism,” “post-industrialism,” “post-modernism,” 
or any number of other terms, the new phase of capitalism,66 with its 
neoliberal characteristics, ideological rejection of industrial production 
as the primary engine for the US economy, embrace of flexible labor, 
and trade in knowledge is one that encourages the creation, protection, 
and valuation of intellectual properties.67 In the post-Fordist world, 
 
65




See, e.g., W. Ron Gard & Elizabeth Townsend Gard, The Present (User-Generated Crisis) Is 
the Past (1909 Copyright Act): An Essay Theorizing the “Traditional Contours of Copyright” 
Language, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455, 481–82 (2011) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted) (citations omitted): 
The fissures that appeared in the system in these postwar decades by the early 1970s 
became full ruptures, and quite quickly the modernist economic configuration of 
Fordism gave way. Since that time a new configuration has been emergent, a 
postmodernist, post-Fordist configuration some have termed ‘flexible accumulation’ 
but is more commonly recognized by the general term ‘globalization.’ In this period, 
production and consumption of goods has continued to expand even as they have 
become ever more adaptable, drawing more and more parts of the world into the 
market system, while the major bases of manufacturing have been relocated to cheaper 
labor markets around the globe. Labor in the United States in particular, but also in 
other fully-developed industrialized nations, increasingly has become information and 
service sector based, while the cultural experience in these countries increasingly has 
become one of consumption. The manufacture of goods occurs almost invisibly and the 
appearance of those goods infinitely arrayed on store shelves seems to happen almost 
magically. . . .[T]he cultural experience of dematerialization presently felt in some 
locations is the result of the global system’s spatial configuration and distribution of 
production and consumption. There is no question that more material goods than ever 
before are being produced. While clear distinctions between Fordist and post-Fordist 
economic configurations can be drawn, both recognizably are spatio-temporal 
formations organized to manage mass production, and, as such, can be traced back to 
the transformations at the end of the nineteenth century when these activities were 
initiated. There is little doubt that the individual experience of cultural change 
occurring at the end of the nineteenth century must have been profound. The spatial 
redistribution of cultural activities coupled with the sudden and growing pervasiveness 
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America became a net exporter of information for the first time in its 
existence, as it shifted from a manufacturing-based to an information-
based economy.68 
Accelerating pushes for privatization and deregulation in the 1980s 
implicated intellectual property as well as its theoretical opposite, the 
public domain. As the desire to own information increased, so too did 
conflicts over the scope and contents of the public domain. In their 2002 
book, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, 
Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite articulate the competing 
considerations as represented by distinct constituencies: “visionaries 
and entrepreneurs who . . . want ever stronger and more rigorously 
policed international standards of intellectual property” and those who 
recognize that “[c]opying and imitation are central to our processes of 
learning and the acquisition of skills. . . . The creator of innovation is 
also always the borrower of ideas and information from others.”69 They 
further argue that the move towards more and stronger intellectual 
property protection has resulted in a “transfer of knowledge assets from 
the intellectual commons into private hands.”70 In essence, we have 
entered the era of the mass privatization of knowledge, an era in which 
information is increasingly treated as an excludable good with the 
characteristics of real property and all too often managed by unregulated 
markets. 
Part of what motivated and continues to inspire the insistence upon 
increasingly more IP protection is technological development. As 
Jessica Litman and Jane Ginsburg note in the copyright context, this 
assertion of the need for expanded IP protection in light of technological 
advancement is not new.71 In fact, that assertion continues apace with 
 
of material goods must have naturally led to a manifestation of value that was 
intricately bound up with material qualities. However, as subsequent historical spatial 
configurations through the twentieth century and up to the present show, what 
ultimately proves more fundamental than the material state of culture, even as material 
elements remain significant and influential, is a society’s exchangist practices, or its 
manner of circulation. 
See Aoki, supra note 27.  
68
See David Nimmer, The Impact of Berne on United States Copyright Law, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 27 (1989). 
69
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 2. Note that Drahos and Braithwaite are 
conflating authors with copyright owners. While they are in great company in doing so, this 
conflation is often quite problematic. See Deidré A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should 
Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016). 
70
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 2–3.  
71
Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 61, 65–
66 (2002) (reviewing JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001)); id. (footnotes omitted) 
(“The self-destructive dance between copyright owners and technology entrepreneurs is hardly 
new, as developments from piano rolls to videotape recorders attest. Nor is today’s invective 
significantly more strident, as even a glance at the legislative history of the 1909 Act mechanical 
license, or recollection of the furor over the Betamax, demonstrate.”).  
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technological advancement.72 In the 1980s, this phenomenon of 
demanding intellectual property protection in response to a 
technological advancement was front and center in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.73 As such, James Lardner, the 
journalist who wrote the definitive book on the history of Sony,74 
dubbed the legal wrangling over the legality of Betamax the “VCR 
Wars.”75 In the thirty years since the VCR Wars, much legal scholarship 
has been written about Sony, both on its specific deficiencies and the 
larger extent to which the law ought to change in response to specific 
technological advancements.76 These critiques notwithstanding, the law 
 
72
Id. at 66. 
I think that recent years’ evolution, from the unfortunate lawsuit seeking to bar sales of 
the ‘Rio’ portable MP3 player, to the misguided Hollings bill that would mandate 
anticopying technology for consumer electronics, offers more of the same. It suggests 
that some copyright owners, if not paranoid, are Pavlovian in their response to new 
means of making copies or communicating works. I don’t mean to say that no 
copyright-owning dog can learn new tricks, but neither do many copyright owners, 
particularly the larger ones, appear to be leaping to unleash these technologies’ 
potential. In this debate, appearance counts a lot; and, whatever their conduct in fact, 
many copyright owners appear—or are portrayed by some vigorous detractors in the 
academy and in the popular press—as hell-bent on stomping out both new technology 
and the scientists and entrepreneurs behind it. 
Id. See also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189–90 (2000) (“Each successive wave of new technology 
was, we were told, so different, so challenging, so fundamentally new, that this body of law had 
better adapt, and quick, or become obsolete.”). 
73
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
74
Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 922 (2005). 
75
See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE AND THE VCR WARS 
(1987); see also PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE 
INTERNET (2012). 
76
As to the former, see, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 941, 943–44 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
Although Sony was the first Supreme Court decision to interpret the 1976 Copyright 
Act, it cited neither the statute nor legislative history to delineate the scope of 
contributory liability. Rather, on the basis of what it asserted as a ‘historic kinship 
between the patent and copyright law,’ the Court engrafted an express provision from 
the Patent Act of 1952 onto the Copyright Act of 1976. The provision, section 271(c) 
of the Patent Act, provides that ‘whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States 
. . . a material part of the [patented] invention, knowing the same to be especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article 
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as 
a contributory infringer.’ Given that the comprehensive reform of the Copyright Act of 
1976 was the result of nearly two decades of deliberation, it seems astonishing for the 
‘Magna Carta for the technology age’ to be rooted not in that voluminous history but 
instead handed down in a contemporaneous judicial decision. When Congress adopted 
the Copyright Act, it could have easily turned to the 1952 Patent Act, where ‘both the 
concept of infringement and the concept of contributory infringement are expressly 
defined by statute.’ Instead, the legislative history of the Copyright Act reveals that 
Congress rooted its considerations regarding contributory infringement elsewhere. This 
Article reveals why the Court chose that unconventional path and thereby places the 
Sony precedent in its proper legislative and jurisprudential perspective.  
Id. Regarding the latter, see, e.g., Merges, supra note 72, at 2190 (“Detailed, technology-specific 
amendments thus thwart, to some extent, the quasi-common-law process by which IP law is 
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has indeed changed quite a bit to accommodate changes in technology 
over those thirty years.77 Sheila Jasanoff’s theorization of “interactional 
coproduction”78 is useful in conceptualizing the mutually constitutive 
relationship between technology and intellectual property law. Writing 
in the context of Science and Technology Studies, Jasanoff proposes 
that epistemological approaches to technology emerge through an 
interactional relationship with institutional and cultural knowledge.79 
She argues, “scientific ideas and beliefs, and (often) associated 
technological artifacts, evolve together with the representations, 
identities, discourses, and institutions that give practical effect and 
meaning to ideas and objects.”80 We can read Jasanoff’s framework 
more broadly to understand how intellectual property law, technology, 
and race coproduce one another and facilitate the development of new 
forms of biopolitics.81 In other words, intellectual property law’s 
orientation to technology shapes and is shaped by structures of race and 
capitalism in a way that informs state management over life and bodies. 
Perhaps the most striking change to copyright law since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony is the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), which David Nimmer goes so far as to call 
“nonsense on stilts.”82 It may also be fairly characterized as the most 
immediate and consequential change to copyright law in the United 
States to be specifically spurred by a particular technological 
advancement—the Internet.83 In the nearly two decades since the 
passage of the DMCA, many IP scholars have criticized it.84 The 
primary critique of the DMCA has been that it curtails fair use and 
thereby infringes upon the First Amendment rights of users.85 Though 
 
elaborated. The recent erosion of what might be termed ‘legislative slack’ is hardly surprising. 
Much more money is at stake in IP legislation than in the past. With higher stakes comes greater 
desire to nail down the details of protection—and greater reluctance to leave important issues to 
the courts. Economic theory and common sense both predict as much: more specific, highly 
elaborated property rights are worth lobbying for when the assets they cover are more valuable.”). 
77
See generally David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 
1242 (2004) for a discussion of those technological changes. 
78
Sheila Jasanoff, Ordering Knowledge, ordering society, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE 13 (Sheila 




Co-Production, SHEILA JASANOFF, http://sheilajasanoff.org/research/co-production (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2017)(emphasis in original). 
81 See, generally, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE 
DE FRANCE 1978-79 (ed. Michel Senellart, et. al. 2004). 
82
Nimmer, supra note 77, at 1342 (citation omitted). New dot coms like Google, Amazon, and 
Facebook also changed the face of American capitalism. However, given the historical period we 
are highlighting here, i.e., the 1970s through the 1990s, we have left the intellectual property 
issues that their business models raise for another day.  
83
Id. at 1375 (“With such sorry results, it is useful to reflect on the exigency that compelled 
Congress to adopt the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The Internet was then very much on 
Congress’ mind.”). 
84
See, e.g., id.  
85
See generally Marc J. Randazza, Lenz v. Universal: A Call to Reform Section 512(f) of the 
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there have been some instances in which courts refused to recognize 
new or broader IP rights,86 the trend has definitely been towards more 
expansive IP protection.87 
Similar trends are evident in other areas of intellectual property 
law. As copyright protection was expanding through legislation such as 
the DMCA, trademarks were becoming increasingly important in the 
negotiation of identity. Rosemary Coombe notes the role of trademarks 
in identity formation as well as national identity formation. She writes, 
referring to Michael Warner’s work on public spheres, “‘we have brand 
names all over us.’ Trademarks, [Warner] suggests, are constitutive 
parts of a public sphere—constructing a common discourse to bind the 
subject to the nation and to its markets.”88 With the acceleration of 
globalization and the rise of free trade, brands became increasingly 
valuable commodities separate from the products that they marked. 
Benjamin Barber’s concept of “McWorld” describes globalization’s 
tendency to produce interconnected markets, notably markets in which 
trademarked products can circulate. As he notes, companies such as 
Nike, Microsoft, Apple, and Genentech, all of which grew considerably 
in the 1970s and 1980s, “represent a new form of economic power.”89 
The structural changes associated with neoliberal capitalism, including 
President Ronald Reagan’s moves toward deregulation, criminalization, 
and stronger trademark and copyright laws, ushered in, as Naomi Klein 
contends, a new era of “trademark harassment.”90 The “cultural and 
linguistic privatization”91 of the moment fueled the move to a 
contemporary age in which brands are valuable commodities even apart 
from the products to which they are attached. Notably, Reagan signed 
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 which was an early, though 
relatively narrow, step toward criminalizing intellectual property 
violations.92 One 1984 law review article proclaimed: “Commercial 
trademark counterfeiting in the United States is a problem which 
threatens to go out of control.”93 Claims such as this one fueled 
maximalist trademark and unfair competition policy by asserting that 
 
DMCA and to Strengthen Fair Use, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 743 (2016). 
86
See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
87
DEBORA J. HALBERT, THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS OF 
CULTURAL CREATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (2014). 
88
Rosemary J. Coombe, Marking Difference in American Commerce: Trademarks and Alterity at 
Century’s End, 19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 105, 105 (1996) (In an early 
commentary on the connections between trademark and race, Coombe notes that “[s]uch legal 
forms always invite encounters with alterity.”). 
89
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 54 (2001). 
90




Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012). 
93
Robert J. Abalos, Commercial Trademark Counterfeiting in the United States, the Third World 
and Beyond: American and International Attempts to Stem the Tide, 5 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
151, 151 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
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the status quo constituted under-protection.94 
In the context of patent law, new scientific discoveries and 
globalization, especially after the negotiation of TRIPS in the mid-
1990s, drove the extraction of potentially valuable biological resources 
for the development of new drugs, often from the developing world, and 
experimentation with gene therapies.95 Cases such as Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty96 and Moore v. Regents of the University of California97 
paved the way for the private ownership of biological materials.98 As 
biotechnology flourished, courts applying Chakrabarty found and 
continue to find plants, genetically modified mammals, and certain 
types of genetic material to be patentable subject matter.99 The 
pushback against the monetization of such materials was and remains 
tremendous. Critiques of biopiracy100 and the exploitation of 
individuals’ biological material for monetary gain have continued to 
gain traction even today.101 
The push for more protection and related critiques extended to 
other areas of intellectual property law, such as rights of publicity and 
trade secrets, as well.102 The move toward intellectual property 
maximalism across bodies of law prompted urgent questions about the 
 
94
Id. For a general discussion of maximalist trademark policy, see, e.g., Coombe, supra note 88; 
Klein, supra note 55. 
95
See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000). 
96
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
97
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
98
For a brief discussion of ownership in biological and genetic materials, see, e.g., Osagie K. 
Obasogie, Your Body, Their Property, BOS. REV. (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://bostonreview.net/us/obasogie-gene-patent-myriad-moore. 
99
For a general overview of these developments, see Jane M. Marciniszyn, What Has Happened 
Since Chakrabarty?, 2 J.L. & HEALTH 141 (1988). For the patentability of plants and animals, see 
Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, From Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for Evolutionary 
Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505 (2000); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (Supreme Court faced the question of whether human 
genes are patentable and held that isolated DNA is not patentable subject matter while 
synthetically-created DNA is patent eligible.). 
100
Shiva, supra note 54. 
101
Joseph M. Healy, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the Doctor-
Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 42 MERCER 
L. REV. 989, 990 (1991) (observing that “it is impossible to overlook the extent to which 
medicine, once viewed respectfully as an artful science, has assumed the characteristics of a 
business and, as a consequence, finds itself increasingly under the critical scrutiny of its 
customers and its regulators.”). 
102
Vanna White sued Samsung claiming their commercial depicting a robot wearing a wig and a 
dress and posed beside a Wheel of Fortune board infringed upon her right of publicity. The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision denying Samsung summary judgment has been read as expanding the scope of 
intellectual property law considerably, through protection of property rights in evoking a 
particular celebrity. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Arlen 
W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 
45 KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997); see also Rosemary J. Coombe, The Celebrity Image and Cultural 
Identity: Publicity Rights and the Subaltern Politics of Gender, 14 DISCOURSE 59 (1992), for a 
discussion of celebrity and property rights. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898 
KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2018  6:00 PM 
752 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 36:3 
relationship between intellectual properties, race, and inequality, 
including the extent to which copyright, trademark, patent, right of 
publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition law shape racial 
categories and operate as potential sites for renegotiating racial power 
relations. If Drahos and Brathwaite are right in arguing that we are 
steadily moving toward a situation in which relatively few global 
conglomerates are in possession of the vast majority of the intellectual 
property resources,103 then there is no question that we are also moving 
toward the further marginalization of those who are currently situated at 
the edges of the intellectual property system. Scholars considering the 
power hierarchies inherent in intellectual property regimes formed the 
core of Critical IP literature. In the next section, we contextualize those 
scholars within the larger Critical Legal Studies movement. 
B. From CLS to Critical IP 
In 1982, Margaret Jane Radin, in a landmark piece entitled 
“Property and Personhood,” made the argument that fully-realized 
personhood requires access to and control over at least some “personal 
property.”104 Her Hegelian argument offers a rights-based justification 
for ensuring the stability and security of property that is integral to 
personhood.105 Radin’s argument is an appropriate place to begin 
because it engages and informs many of the themes that emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s in the areas of CLS, Feminist Jurisprudence, and CRT, 
including how law might become a more economically and socially just 
enterprise.106 Specifically, the interrogation of property as both a 
cultural and racial construct formed the backbone of the scholarly 
innovations that followed years later in the area of Critical Race IP. 
Revealing possibilities for reinterpreting property paved the way for 
new and radical claims about rethinking and remaking intellectual 
property.107 Around the same time as Radin published her 
 
103
DRAHOS WITH BRATHWAITE, supra note 59, at 3 (“These hands belong to media 
conglomerates and integrated life sciences corporations rather than individual scientists and 
authors. The effect of this, we argue, is to raise levels of private monopolistic power to dangerous 
global heights, at a time when states, which have been weakened by the forces of globalization, 
have less capacity to protect their citizens from the consequences of the exercise of this power.”). 
104




Because the categories of CLS, Feminist Jurisprudence, and CRT are often overlapping, we 
use one footnote here. Radin’s Property and Personhood has been cited, according to Google 
Scholar, 2,018 times as of May 12, 2018 at 11:58 P.M. Some of those landmark pieces which 
engage her work in order to get at questions of equity, justice, gender, and race in law include: 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (reprt. ed. 1991); 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (9th prtg. 
1994); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 400 (1987). 
107
See, e.g., Paul K. Saint-Amour, Your Right to What’s Mine: On Personal Intellectual 
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groundbreaking work, CLS and civil rights scholars were facing 
considerable critique from a subset of scholars interested specifically in 
the racial hierarchies embedded in the law and in pushing civil rights 
discourse in a more progressive direction. These contentions would 
form the basis of the Critical Race Theory movement. 
CRT, according to Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, 
and Kendall Thomas, “embraces a movement of left scholars, most of 
them scholars of color, situated in law schools, whose work challenges 
the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented 
in American legal culture and, more generally, in American society as a 
whole.”108 CRT emerged from critiques of the Civil Rights Movement 
and its rights-based approach to equality in the United States.109 While 
CLS was making many important interventions in the areas of class and 
power, many found its analysis of race to be inadequate. Scholars 
particularly interested in questions of racial hierarchy, who had been 
attending CLS meetings, began to meet independently of CLS and 
articulate a progressive legal perspective that centered race as a 
necessary and important starting point for inquiries into inequality.110 
Those early meetings were the beginning of what would become CRT. 
It did not take long for first generation CRT scholars to turn to questions 
of intellectual property.111 
Rosemary Coombe, who had been developing a framework for 
studying the intersections between culture and intellectual property, 
often in the context of race, became one of the first scholars to focus 
attention on the racial and colonial dimensions of copyrights and 
trademarks.112 Then, in 1996, Keith Aoki authored a piece entitled 
“(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural 
Geography of Authorship.”113 The article, one of the earliest to 
expressly invoke CRT in the context of intellectual property law, 
advances an interdisciplinary critique of attempts to globalize 
intellectual property rights, particularly copyright, without attending to 
 
Property, 25 LAW & LITERATURE 103 (2013) (arguing from Radin that users may have personal 
interests in copyrighted works). 
108
Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xiii. 
109
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (serving as a starting point for CRT).  
110
Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xviii–xix. We note that, in many ways, this break with CLS 
signified a symbolic and ideological break with the mainstream white, American liberalism that 
had failed African Americans. 
111
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, The Stakes of Intellectual Property Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 259 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
112
Coombe’s early articles, which make up much of her 1998 book, pushed for critical/ cultural 
legal studies, one which examined racial and colonial politics. See e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The 
Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural 
Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 249 (1993). 
113
Aoki, supra note 27. 
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the politics of local development.114 At the core of Aoki’s argument is 
an observation that the one size fits all model of international 
intellectual property, animated by the figure of the Romantic Author 
who is capable of “original” work, speciously justifies maximalist 
copyright policy based in fictions of universality that are actually 
grounded in European-ness.115 He writes: 
As the discourse of authorship produces a particular type of 
intellectual property owner (the author), the discourse of 
globalization produces a very particular and peculiar representation 
of the globe. At their intersection, the discourses of authorship and 
globalization privilege at least six dominant . . . norms within Anglo-
American legal thought (as Rosemary Coombe delineates): (1) a 
clear distinction between categories of public and private; (2) a sharp 
distinction between property and speech; (3) an Enlightenment-
derived, linear model of progress; (3) a deeply held commitment to 
and belief in a marketplace of ideas; (5) a faith (at least up until fairly 
recently) in the transparency of language; and (6) a foundational 
belief in the commensurability of all things, that is, that all things 
may be reduced to a common metric understood by all . . . .
116
 
Aoki’s essay presages the major themes that progressive 
intellectual property scholars have been now considering for two 
decades, including Eurocentrism and inequity, the Enlightenment, and 
distributive justice. While authorship is only one factor in progressive 
intellectual property, Aoki’s work offers a starting point for 
contemplating various strands of critique that have developed over the 
years. We turn to those themes in the next section, focusing on how 
scholars like Coombe, Aoki, and others laid the groundwork for Critical 
Race IP. 
Aoki’s piece was an early example of what Tehranian describes as 
Critical IP scholarship.117 While Tehranian’s consideration of Critical IP 
as an area of study is important, we believe it equally important to place 
questions of race, racialization, and racism at the center of 
considerations of intellectual property. In Tehranian’s formulation, race, 
though a sufficient marker of Critical IP, is not a necessary axis of 







Id. at 1341–42. 
117
Tehranian, supra note 40. In the interest of articulating the actual provenance of the term, 
“critical intellectual property,” as we understand it, we note that the first use of the term of which 
we are aware was in an article by Laura A. Foster. See Laura A. Foster, Situating Feminism, 
Patent Law, and the Public Domain, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 262 (2011). 
118
Tehranian, supra note 40, at 1244 (broadly defining “‘critical IP theory’ . . . as the 
deconstruction of trademark, copyright, and patent laws and norms in light of existing power 
relationships to better understand the role of intellectual property in both maintaining and 
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for intellectual property analysis for which existing considerations of 
power, inequality, or distributive justice simply do not fully account. 
Because Critical IP proceeds from a rather broad set of values to assess 
the relationship between intellectual property and, in Tehranian’s 
words, “subordination,”119 we believe that such a framework cannot do 
the work of questioning racial liberalism and supplanting 
Eurocentricism that is central to CRT. As such, Critical IP may replicate 
some of the same oversights of CLS, inadvertently eliding questions of 
race.120 
Valdes, et al. in describing future directions of CRT argue that 
CRT engages three principle ideas: (1) race consciousness is necessary 
to address structural racism; (2) racism is not the work of a few “bad-
apple[s]” but the result of systemic institutional and ideological 
discrimination; and (3) intersectionality is important to any critical race 
analysis.121 We explicitly describe and advocate for a Critical Race IP in 
which scholars bring these principal ideas to bear upon intellectual 
property. At the Race + IP Conference in April 2017, we engaged in 
many discussions which we believe to be only the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of the potentially productive topics, issues, and insights that 
theorizing Critical Race IP might yield. In the next section, we elaborate 
on the themes that we see as anchoring the development of Critical 
Race IP up until this point and directing its development into the future. 
II. LOCATING CRITICAL RACE IP 
In the first plenary session at Race + IP 2017, Boatema Boateng 
posed the question “why Critical Race IP?”122 In part, her query 
highlighted the need for multiple types of theoretical inquiry into 
intellectual property’s relationships to race and social justice. It further 
suggested the possibility of using CRT to inform the study of 
intellectual property without formally naming the resulting scholarship. 
It also asks us to consider why investment in Critical Race IP as a 
 




Cf. Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xiii–xiv (describing the oversights of CLS that, in part, 
led to the development of CRT). 
121
Valdes, et al., supra note 24, at 2. 
122
Part of the “why Critical Race IP?” question involves distinguishing the title of the 
conference, Race + IP, from our conceptualization of Critical Race IP. In contemplating the 
inclusivity of the conference as well as its exploratory nature, we offered Race + IP as a 
provocation to consider the aims, methods, and theories that the intersections of race and 
intellectual property might produce. However, studying the intersections of race and intellectual 
property does not necessarily involve addressing the questions that Valdes et al. focus on as 
important to CRT. For instance, a study of the demographics of inventors of color may or may 
not be invested in race-conscious or intersectional analysis of the intellectual property system. 
We, therefore, offer Critical Race IP as a narrower inquiry, which while no less important than 
Race + IP, poses a different set of questions with particular scholarly antecedents.  
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named area of study is important. We believe naming Critical Race IP is 
a vital move, not only because it aids in reflecting upon the connections 
between the work of scholars writing about race, social justice, and 
intellectual property but also because it creates material stakes in the 
study of the intersections of those topics. With respect to the former, 
identifying the themes that tie together works at the intersections of race 
and intellectual property across disciplines lays the groundwork for 
imagining new directions for future scholarship. With respect to the 
latter, naming Critical Race IP quite literally brings into being a new 
area of study in which new scholars as well as institutions can invest—
in material and ideological ways. Though we recognize the liabilities of 
institutionalizing radical theoretical positions, naming and articulating 
the stakes of Critical Race IP will bring important countervailing 
benefits. 
Naming practices are necessarily political. Whether in the context 
of rejecting slave names in lieu of chosen names,123 refusing to 
acknowledge the interests of groups in political negotiations by not 
naming them,124 articulating new legal protections for age-old 
wrongs,125 or developing new names for unprotected practices,126 
 
123
Kimberly W. Benston, “I Yam what I Am”: Naming and Unnaming in Afro-American 
Literature, 16 BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 1, 3 (1982) (citing MALCOLM X, MALCOLM X ON 
AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (Merit Publishers 1967)).  
Language—that fundamental act of organizing the mind’s encounter with an 
experienced world—is propelled by a rhythm of naming: It is the means by which the 
mind takes possession of the named, at once fixing the named as irreversibly Other and 
representing it in crystalized isolation from all conditions of externality. Malcolm 
Little, named by the master/father who banished him to his marginal existence, was in 
some measure the slave his given name signified; a ‘so-called Negro,’ he owned 
nothing: ‘As long as you allow them to call you what they wish you don’t know who 
you really are. You can’t lay claim to any name, any home, any destiny, that will 
identify you as something you should be, as someone you should become: a brother 
among brothers.’ 
Id.; see also GRANT FARRED, WHAT’S MY NAME: BLACK VERNACULAR INTELLECTUALS (2003) 
(on the importance of naming in black political tradition); Derek H. Alderman, Place, Naming 
and the Interpretation of Cultural Landscapes, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
HERITAGE AND IDENTITY 195, 201 (Brian Graham & Peter Howard eds., 2008); Ben L. Martin, 
From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming, 106 POL. SCI. Q. 
83, 83 (1991) (“Names can be more than tags; they can convey powerful imagery. So naming—
proposing, imposing, and accepting names—can be a political exercise.”).  
124
Danielle Endres, The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American 
Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision, 6 COMM. & 
CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 39, 50 (2009) (“Instead of explicitly naming American Indians as 
‘savages’ (a common strategy identified in the scholarship on rhetorical colonialism), this 
strategy names American Indian nations as part of the US public by denying government-to-
government negotiations, forcing participation in the public comment period and describing all 
opponents as public critics.”).  
125
See generally Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 1–2 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel 
eds., 2004). 
Sexual harassment is a social practice. Social practices have lives, institutional lives 
and semiotic lives. And so social practices like sexual harassment have histories. 
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among many other examples, it is clear that the choice of when and how 
to name is a significant one. This is particularly true in institutional 
contexts. 
One context in which naming consistently comes up is in 
conversations about academic disciplines and non-disciplines. 
Discussions about naming Cultural Studies are illustrative. While there 
are still relatively few institutionalized Cultural Studies programs, the 
latter retains its identity as an interdisciplinary movement or network, 
much like CRT. We advocate for a similar path for Critical Race IP as a 
means of identifying the political project that scholars are undertaking 
and facilitating more study in that space. An early piece on the 
importance of naming in Cultural Studies notes: 
Yet there are important pressures to define. There is the little daily 
politics of the college or the school-not so little since jobs, resources 
and opportunities for useful work are involved. Cultural studies has 
won real spaces here and they have to be maintained and 
extended . . . terms. We need definitions of cultural studies to 
struggle effectively in these contexts, to make claims for resources, 
to clarify our minds in the rush and muddle of everyday work, and to 
decide priorities for teaching and research
127
 
Names and definitions provide practical grounding and centralized 
focus, “if not as a unity at least as a whole.”128 They can bring 
cohesiveness to an intellectual project, in a manner that grounds it. 
Carbado suggests the same in “Critical What What?” Quoting 
Crenshaw, he writes, “‘what is in play here is less of a definitive 
articulation of CRT and more of socio-cultural narrative of CRT.’ In the 
context of offering this narrative, Crenshaw describes CRT as an 
intellectual and political dynamic that is constantly being 
 
Considering sexual harassment in historical perspective allows us to ask some 
fundamental questions about the nature of the practice, the terms in which it has been 
contested, and the rules and rhetorics by which law constrains—or enables-—the 
conduct in question. My object in these pages is to invite reflection, not only about 
sexual harassment, but also about the law of sex discrimination itself. It is only quite 
recently that sexual harassment acquired the name of ‘sexual harassment’ and was 
prohibited as a form of ‘sex discrimination.’ By examining the process through which a 
persistent and pervasive practice came to be recognized as discrimination ‘on the basis 
of sex,’ we learn much about what law does when it recognizes discrimination. Clearly, 
this act of recognition was a momentous one. For the first time in history, women 




Anjali Vats, (Dis)owning Bikram: Decolonizing vernacular and dewesternizing restructuring 
in the yoga wars, 13 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 325 (2016); see also Chidi 
Oguamanam, Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative Legal Interventions, 
and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489 (2008).  
127
Johnson, supra note 9, at 41. 
128
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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reconstituted.”129 An approach similar to the one that unfolded in 
Cultural Studies and CRT is useful in the context of Critical Race IP. 
Naming Critical Race IP is important for focusing conversations, 
theoretically and conceptually, and marshalling institutional resources. 
Moreover, it is helpful for bringing new scholars and activists into the 
fold. Nevertheless, simultaneously thinking of Critical Race IP as a 
network of scholars who engage intellectual properties through the lens 
of race is a helpful way of capturing its conceptual dynamism and 
constant evolution and avoiding stagnancy or fixity. 
Naming Critical Race IP is also conceptually important in 
delineating how CRT can illuminate the study of intellectual properties. 
For instance, the name Critical Race IP points to how whiteness 
operates not only as property but as intellectual property. It is 
impossible to speak of CRT without invoking Cheryl Harris’s essay 
“Whiteness as Property,” which celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 
2013. Harris’s piece is central to CRT, as well as the study of 
intellectual property and race, in part because it focuses on the 
significant and complex relationship between race and property 
rights.130 Harris highlights how whiteness operates as property, 
conferring a bundle of social and political rights that are exclusively 
granted to those who read as white.131 Harris’s piece now informs a 
wide body of interdisciplinary scholarship which interrogates legal 
definitions of property in the United States, the relationship of those 
definitions to race and personhood, and the ethical considerations of 
such investments.132 The phrase “Critical Race IP” points to the value of 
CRT’s core themes, particularly its acknowledgment of intellectual 
property’s investments in whiteness. Analogizing Harris, white racial 
identity confers not only a bundle of property rights but also intellectual 
property rights.133 Put succinctly, we might rewrite Harris to state that 
this Article “investigates the relationships between concepts of race and 
[intellectual] property and reflects on how rights in [intellectual] 
property are contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with 
race.”134 Whiteness brings with it a set of privileges and presumptions in 
the context of intellectual property: whites have historically constructed 
 
129
Carbado, supra note 14, at 1601. 
130
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). We also note that 
during Race + IP 2017, the plenary sessions continually returned to Harris’s essay because of its 
central importance to the topic at hand.  
131
Id. at 1725–28. 
132
As of the date of publication of this Article, shepardizing Whiteness as Property returns 523 
sources, on topics related to feminism, queer theory, and race. A Google scholar search of the 
work shows 4,016 citing sources as of May 12, 2018 at 11:59 P.M, further demonstrating its 
incredible influence outside of the legal academy.  
133
See DEIDRÉ A. KELLER & ANJALI VATS, CRT-ICIZING COPYRIGHT (Mar. 28, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895866. 
134
Harris, supra note 130, at 1714. 
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information regimes in ways which devalue the knowledge and 
practices of non-whites;135 whites have historically held the power and 
authority to determine the legal structures which govern intellectual 
property rights;136 whites have historically crafted legal doctrines which 
favor the protection of Western understandings of creativity;137 and 
whites largely continue to manage domestic and international 
intellectual property rights regimes.138 
The remainder of this section focuses on articulating not only how 
Harris’s argument regarding property’s racial underpinnings in 
“Whiteness as Property” is, in many ways, analogous to intellectual 
property but also the landscape of the area of study we call Critical Race 
IP. We first explore the meaning of “race” and “IP” in the context of 
Critical Race IP. We then turn to central themes in Critical Race IP 
scholarship, fleshing out their importance in overall discussions of race 
and intellectual property as well as future conversations. We identify 
seven themes which consistently emerge in discussions of race and 
intellectual property: (1) defining intellectual property; (2) intellectual 
property’s stories; (3) traditional knowledge; (4) the public domain; (5) 
framing and reframing infringement, counterfeiting, and piracy; (6) 
access to knowledge (A2K); and (7) Critical Race IP in action. 
A. What is the “Race” in Critical Race IP?139 
Race is the socially constructed category used to describe and 
ascribe value to phenotypic differences between individuals.140 As 
demonstrated by scientific advances in genetics, such as the completion 
of the Human Genome Project, there is no biological basis for treating 
 
135
See, e.g., DEBORA J. HALBERT, RESISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2005) 150 (“Today’s 
biopiracy is simply the extension of the logic behind the doctrine of discovery.”). 
136
See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of 
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 315 (2003). 
137
Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2379 (2009); see also THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL 
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 2d prtg. 
1999); RAYVON FOUCHÉ, BLACK INVENTORS IN THE AGE OF SEGREGATION: GRANVILLE T. 
WOODS, LEWIS H. LATIMER & SHELBY J. DAVIDSON (2003); James Boyle, Foreword: The 
Opposite of Property?, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003). 
138
See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765 (2002). 
139 This subheading and section is inspired by Hall’s essay “What is the ‘black’ in black popular 
culture?” in which he contends that blackness itself is hegemonically negotiated. He writes, 
“mistaking what is historical and cultural for what is natural, biological, and genetic. The moment 
the signifier “black” is torn from its historical, cultural, and political embedding and lodged in a 
biologically constituted racial category, we valorize, by inversion, the very ground of the racism 
we are trying to deconstruct.” Stuart Hall, What is the “black” in black popular culture?, 20 SOC. 
JUST. 104 (2009). 
140
See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994).  
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race as a meaningful category, and, therefore, no biological basis for 
deeming some people “superior” and others “inferior.”141 Rather, as 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue, racial difference is socially 
and materially constructed through racial projects—policy decisions 
based on historically contingent understandings of the meaning of race. 
In Omi and Winant’s formulation, the term racial formation describes 
“the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, 
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed”142 specifically through 
“historically situated projects in which human bodies and social 
structures are represented and organized.”143 Legislative and judicial 
definitions of race, as Ian Haney Lopez describes in his groundbreaking 
text White by Law, were and continue to be integral in rhetorically 
defining racial categories as well as materially shaping race through the 
grant and denial of rights and privileges.144 That said, while the 
definitions of race we engage here are useful starting points for thinking 
about racial categories and how they are constituted, they do not help us 
to situate race in particular historical contexts or in specific academic 
and activist contexts. We now turn to the question of how we might 
specifically think of the “race” in Critical Race IP. 
Race is, in Stuart Hall’s terms, a “floating signifier.”145 It does not 
have a fixed meaning; rather, it is term with no clear referent whose 
meaning is contingent on time, place, and context.146 To speak of race in 
CRT or Critical Race IP, then, is not to speak of a static category; it is to 
speak of an item that is contextually defined. In CRT, race originally 
centered on black/white binaries in a post-Civil Rights context.147 That 
is not to say that Race Crits did not recognize the existence of race in 
other spaces, simply that they chose to theorize it primarily vis-à-vis 
Black/white binaries. Subsequent conversations in CRT resulted in a 
broader theorization of law and race, through studies of Asians as model 
 
141
ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION 
AFTER THE GENOME 13 (2016) (footnote omitted) (“Under the flashing glare of the international 
press corps’ cameras, President Bill Clinton—flanked by Venter and National Human Genome 
Research Institute director Francis Collins, and with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain joining 
in via remote video—breathlessly declared that ‘one of the great truths to emerge from this 
triumphant expedition inside the human genome is that in genetic terms, all human beings, 
regardless of race, are more than 99.9 percent the same . . . .’”). 
142
OMI & WINANT, supra note 142, at 55–56. 
143
Id (emphasis in original). 
144
IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1997) (For 
instance, Lopez describes how anti-miscegenation laws, by preventing interracial mixing, affected 
the physical and biological realities of those who procreated.). 
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minorities,148 Latinos as beyond the black/white binary,149 and racial 
categories as geographically and temporally bounded social 
constructions.150 Moreover, the latter studies resulted in cross-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary conversations about the investments of 
the legal academy and its power structures in whiteness.151 The race in 
CRT is therefore unfixed. It is a signifier with constantly changing 
meaning which evolves based on the everyday practices of individuals, 
including scholars, and the cultural and historical conditions of the 
times. Echoing Carbado, we might imagine the race in CRT as a verb—
one which describes the process through which institutional and cultural 
practices, including in law and the academy, make, constitute, and undo 
racial categories. The race in contemporary CRT scholarship might be 
more succinctly described as a floating signifier which refers to the 
tendency of culture and institutions to operate in ways that, implicitly or 
explicitly, protect the interests of whiteness at the expense of people of 
color instead of making space for radical equality built on foundations 
of restorative justice. 
We imagine the race in Critical Race IP similarly. Instead of 
focusing on the social construction of differences based on skin color, 
we invoke race to describe the many ways intellectual property 
discourses play a central role in the protection of whiteness. The study 
of race in the context of intellectual properties must be an intersectional 
enterprise, involving the coordinated examination of categories such as 
gender, class, and sexual orientation.152 An originalist reading of the 
race in Critical Race IP might limit analysis to only black/white binaries 
in the United States or legal regimes around civil rights. However, such 
a definition of race is both overly narrow and inconsistent with the 
trajectory that CRT has taken over the past decade.  
Instead, we encourage a reading of the race in Critical Race IP as a 
broad intersectional and transnational category of analysis that leaves 
space for discussions of the Global South with respect to distributive 
justice, access to knowledge, and even neo-coloniality. Nikhil Pal 
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Singh’s writing on the whiteness of police is instructive in thinking 
about the landscape of the race in Critical Race IP:  
 
Whiteness…does not issue directly from private property. It emerges 
from the governance of property and its interests in relationship to 
those who have no property and thus no calculable interests, and who 





Studying the race in Critical Race IP entails mapping, theorizing, 
and remaking understandings of the lawful and just governance of 
intellectual property, which, like the police in the realm of embodied 
relations, serves to normalize and reinforce whiteness. It further requires 
asking who is imagined as a legitimate intellectual property owner and 
who is envisioned as a threat to the (intellectual) propertied order. 
Focusing on systems of governance of intellectual property and 
narratives of transgression reveals the racial contours of intellectual 
property and offers important starting points for reconceptualizing its 
racial investments. We are not contending that we ought not 
contemplate the meaning of race as a culturally constructed lens for 
understanding and ascribing value to phenotypic difference, rather that 
we must situate and contextualize that understanding of race, by and 
through examination of intellectual property governance and the racial 
stories which we consistently tell around copyrights, trademarks, 
patents, and so on. Doing so allows us to locate race, not as a static 
category, but an ever-changing one. We therefore understand the race in 
Critical Race IP as invoking the spirit and thematic directions of CRT 
scholarship, in a manner which attends to that area’s core tenets about 
the investment of culturally constructed institutional regimes in directly 
or indirectly advancing the interests of whiteness. As discussed through 
individual themes below, not all questions of racial justice in intellectual 
property have been previously invoked in CRT. However, insofar as 
these themes involve questions of racial non-neutrality in intellectual 
property and knowledge protection contexts, they are consonant with 
the race in CRT.  
B. What is the “IP” in Critical Race IP? 
Traditionally, intellectual property means the laws of copyrights, 
trademarks, patents, rights of publicity, trade secrets, and/or unfair 
competition.154 Navigating intellectual property requires a broad 
 
153
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154
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understanding of the interrelationships between and among these legal 
doctrines and other areas of law including contracts, constitutional law, 
and property. While this interrelatedness is not unique to IP, it is notable 
considering Richard Stallman’s critique that intellectual property is a 
“seductive mirage”155 through which content owners group together 
types of law that are, in fact, very different and materially so. 
While the “IP” in Critical Race IP is not intended to homogenize 
the various types of intellectual property law, it nonetheless points to 
the need to study intellectual property both as a mass noun through 
which policy is obscured and the component parts of that mass noun. 
Moreover, the work of intellectual property scholars, particularly those 
concerned with social justice, increasingly reflects the reality that 
copyrights, trademarks, patents, rights of publicity, trade secrets, and 
claims of unfair competition are not simply legal regimes confined to 
the realm of law but cultural objects that move through everyday life.156 
That is increasingly true given the growth of international intellectual 
property regimes and appeals to human rights norms as a means of 
protecting the interests of marginalized peoples. Untangling the cultural 
implications of intellectual properties and intellectual property law, and 
not simply the legal regimes themselves, is therefore central to the “IP” 
in Critical Race IP. 
Broadly framing “IP” encourages a thorough analysis of the ways 
intellectual property law implicates race, at domestic and international 
levels. This broad reading of “IP” is evident in Critical Race IP 
scholarship. Each of the areas of intellectual property law we have 
mentioned—copyright,157 trademark,158 patent,159 right of publicity,160 
trade secret,161 and unfair competition162—has a healthy and growing 
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body of scholarship considering its relationship with race. We both 
identify and encourage this broad reading of the “IP” in Critical Race IP 
as a means of theorizing and remedying the many ways intellectual 
properties are racially non-neutral and mutually constitutive of the 
category of race and processes of racial formation. 
C. (Un)bounding Critical Race IP 
During Race + IP 2017, fifteen plenary speakers and several dozen 
concurrent speakers presented papers speaking to the issues at the 
intersections of race and intellectual property from a variety of 
disciplinary vantage points.163 We do not endeavor to recap the 
conference or create a comprehensive list of scholars whose work might 
be defined as falling within the area of Critical Race IP. Instead, we are 
interested in tracing themes that repeatedly arise at the intersections of 
intellectual property, race, and social justice – at the conference and in 
other scholarly writings – and highlighting the common tenets useful in 
articulating Critical Race IP. We observe several consistent themes that 
arise in the work of those concerned with intellectual properties not only 
as tools for securing legal rights but also as cultural and racial 
formations with which we engage every day. We have also observed 
some core tenets that arise from these thematic engagements. 
The themes we identify are not intended to (un)bound Critical 
Race IP. Rather they are best read as a provisional and evolving 
mapping of the existing work that might inform a Critical Race IP. This 
spatial metaphor might be best read through the political geography-
inspired framework Keith Aoki suggested for CRT.164 Where Aoki calls 
for legal scholars to recognize and contest “the inertness and apparent 
neutrality of space”165 such as the Third World, we attend to the 
landscape of Critical Race IP scholarship, often written by “‘outsider’ 
scholars . . . many of whom are themselves space invaders of academia 
at large.”166 Identifying and articulating the central themes of Critical 
Race IP creates a conceptual overview of the spaces scholars who are 
doing intersectional race work in intellectual property law: (1) have 
occupied; (2) continue to occupy; (3) might occupy in the future; and 
(4) have not yet attempted or succeeded in occupying. Such a 
provisional mapping allows us to imagine a path forward, one in which 
“the faces at the bottom” and “outsider” scholars in intellectual property 
contexts are no longer simply “space invaders” but part of a multiverse 
 
162
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of understandings about the creation and management of knowledge, 
including through the making, evolution, and enforcement of law and its 
engagements with race. 
One way to anchor this provisional mapping is to consider how 
Critical Race IP orients itself toward ideas of (intellectual) property and 
personhood. Scholarship in race and intellectual property, like Harris’s 
“Whiteness as Property,” has adopted questions about race, property, 
and personhood as fundamental issues, asking how intellectual property 
is defined, how it ought to be defined, and the racial and social justice 
implications that flow from such definitions.167 A central issue in 
Critical Race IP scholarship—one which might be called a fundamental 
tenet of the interdisciplinary movement—is critical analysis of how 
intellectual property does and should relate to conceptual personhood, 
particularly for those that were not and are not, explicitly and/or 
implicitly, considered to be fully human. Widely accepted definitions of 
intellectual property emerge from Lockean understandings of property, 
which dictate that engaging in the “sweat of the brow” entitles a person 
to ownership of the fruits of his labors.168 Critical Race IP scholars not 
only push against the sweat of the brow theory, they also reframe it in 
ways that make different kinds of epistemological understandings of 
creation possible. In many ways, the themes we identify are all 
negotiations of a fundamental set of questions: Whose labor is valuable? 
How is it valued? What systems underpin those definitions of labor? 
And how do we alter and remake the systems that undervalue the 
knowledge of people of color and maintain systems of white 
supremacy? 
For instance, Madhavi Sunder, in the piece “Property in 
Personhood,” takes up Margaret Jane Radin’s argument from 
“Personhood and Property” and theorizes some of the ways intellectual 
property law can serve as a site for the assertion of property rights in 
personhood in the context of traditional knowledge.169 Sunder again 
engages such questions in “IP3,”170 in which she traces how intellectual 
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property can be used to protect “human flourishing.”171 Kristin 
Carpenter, Angela Riley, and Sonia Katyal, in “In Defense of Property,” 
also consider definitions of property and personhood in order to 
advocate for broadening understanding of (intellectual) property to 
account for the protection of traditional knowledge.172 These moves to 
re-conceptualize the property in intellectual property are central to both 
the race and intellectual property parts of Critical Race IP, in part 
because, as we argued earlier, whiteness has operated as a marker of the 
capacity and right to create and own property, including intellectual 
property.173 These are helpful antecedents for thinking about how 
Critical Race IP reframes questions that are otherwise taken for granted 
in intellectual property law. 
Related to questions of defining (intellectual) property are attempts 
to redefine the scope of both. Coombe, for instance, writes about 
interventions by Crazy Horse’s ancestors to invalidate the trademark for 
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor through legal channels.174 Lovalerie King 
identifies Alice Randall’s victory in publishing The Wind Done Gone as 
an example of law and literature accommodating African American 
memory.175 Richard Schur discusses the productive politics of hip-hop 
culture and the racism of refusing to protect the work of black artists.176 
Vats reads Marshawn Lynch’s trademarking of the name Beast Mode as 
a move to claim intellectual property rights in his black body and 
contest the narrative of the Black Beast.177 Minh-Ha T. Pham discusses 
how extralegal disciplining of Asians in the context of fashion creates 
racialized copynorms even in the absence of illegality.178 These 
examples, which only scratch the surface of discussions on the nature 
and scope of relations among (intellectual) property and people of color, 
demonstrate the centrality of questions of property and personhood in 
tying together the interdisciplinary movement of Critical Race IP. 
Conversations in this area continue to evolve, as people of color 
theorize, enact, and perform new relationships to intellectual properties, 
discursively and materially, thereby changing the material realities in 
which they live. 
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In addition to defining intellectual property in ways which 
recognize and attempt to undo its protection of the norms and attendant 
authority of whiteness, our mapping identifies several recurring themes: 
(1) understanding, situating, and retelling intellectual property’s stories; 
(2) grappling with the problems of “traditional knowledge,” “indigenous 
knowledge,” and “folklore” under international intellectual property and 
human rights regimes; (3) defining and negotiating the scope of the 
public domain; (4) framing and reframing concepts of “infringement,” 
“counterfeiting,” and “piracy;” (5) considering the role of distributive 
justice and Access to Knowledge (A2K); and (6) remaking intellectual 
property law to reflect those “faces at the bottom” and with an eye 
toward real-world solutions. While we have articulated these as distinct 
themes, they often overlap and cross multiple areas of law. Because a 
full exploration of the depth and breadth of these themes is beyond the 
scope of this piece, we offer only broad overviews in the hopes that 
future Race IP Crits will work through each of the themes with greater 
detail. The map, one might say, is not a tidy one but one which reflects 
the (un)bounded nature of intellectual property law. From these themes, 
we can see Critical Race IP as a network of scholarship focused on how 
intellectual property scholars take intersectional approaches to 
considering the ways people of color are deprived of the rights to create 
and access knowledge, often through justifications that render them less 
than human, and theoretical and practical approaches to combating such 
inequality. 
1. Storytelling as Critical Race IP Praxis 
Storytelling practices familiar to Race Crits pervaded Race + IP 
2017. The authors of this Article began and ended the conference with 
stories of Prince as an intellectual property icon, reading him in the 
larger context of race, copyright, and musical appropriation.179 
Kembrew McLeod spoke about Clyde Stubblefield’s erasure from 
James Brown’s “Funky Drummer” and the subsequent sampling of his 
unprotected rhythmic work.180 Richard Schur discussed the importance 
of storytelling as methodological intervention in relation to Critical 
Race IP.181 Margaret Chon crafted a narrative history of race and 
intellectual property, through the work of CRT pioneers such as Keith 
Aoki and Kimberlé Crenshaw and her own insights about the directions 
of the interdisciplinary movement.182 Talks such as these epitomize the 
storytelling practices that often characterize CRT scholarship, with their 
emphasis on personal experiences, re-contextualizing familiar 
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narratives, centering voices that might otherwise remain unheard, and 
writing scholarly histories. More intangibly speaking, they also serve 
important affective functions, such as creating feelings of connection, 
engagement, and common purpose. Storytelling is alive and well in 
Critical Race IP. 
As each of the themes that we highlight demonstrates, intellectual 
property law, as much as law more generally, is about crafting 
narratives which are implicitly or explicitly racialized. Whether through 
understandings of intellectual property which marginalize people of 
color by emphasizing labor as creativity,183 narratives of piracy which 
characterize those in the developing world as thieves,184 or stories of the 
public domain which erase colonial histories,185 copyright, trademark, 
patent, right of publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition law are 
rife with normative racial discourses of creation. One important 
function of Critical Race IP scholarship is to render visible through 
counter-storytelling those narratives that animate intellectual property 
law’s non-neutrality around race. Engaging the underlying characters, 
plots, and values these stories endorse is a vital step in undoing 
intellectual property’s whiteness. Moreover, we might also read creative 
works and embodied performances as part of the practice of speaking 
back to intellectual property law, in the tradition of the legal fiction of 
scholars such as Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado.186 For instance, 2 
Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman,” Biz Markie’s “Alone Again,” and 
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone function as their own types of counter-
storytelling, operating as “sites of memory” 187 for alternative 
intellectual property truths. As Schur argues in Parodies of Ownership, 
African American performance, including hip hop and parody, operates 
as both powerful critique and pragmatic remaking of intellectual 
property law.188 
Counter-stories need not be literary or musical. For instance, 
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protests against Crazy Horse liquor189 and Marshawn Lynch’s 
trademarking of the nickname BeastMode190 might be read as embodied 
and performative practices of storytelling, which both assert different 
epistemological standpoints than those in dominant culture. Each 
standpoint is used to understand knowledge production and critique the 
historical exclusion of people of color, particularly black people, from 
the privileges of intellectual property ownership. Exploring the role of 
storytelling in knowledge production, in forms that both comport with 
and break from those traditionally accepted in the academy, is a 
productive goal for Critical Race IP, and builds upon a long history in 
CRT. Storytelling is a practice that has been and remains important to 
Critical Race IP, as a mechanism for locating the voices of marginalized 
groups and centering them in legal contexts that otherwise erase them. 
2. Protecting Traditional Knowledge 
Early conflicts between harmonization of free trade and 
intellectual property regimes and the developing world often revolved 
around the management of traditional knowledge. Vandana Shiva’s 
Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge was an important 
post-TRIPS critique of the practices of bioprospecting that allowed 
scientists, predominantly in the Western world, to commodify 
traditional knowledge.191 Since the publication of Shiva’s work, race 
and intellectual property scholars have turned to considering how best 
to manage the protection of traditional knowledge, indigenous 
knowledge, cultural property, and folklore under the rubrics currently 
set out by intellectual property law—or those yet to be constructed. The 
treatment of traditional knowledge under TRIPS occupied a 
considerable amount of space in intellectual property conversations 
through the early 2000s. It remains an important point of conversation 
in determining how international intellectual property regimes should 
understand and treat non-Western knowledge.192 Pioneers in the area of 
protecting traditional knowledge have considered the contours of 
protecting TK in the context of different groups; for example, 
indigenous Australians,193 Ghanaian kente weavers,194 Indian artisans,195 
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and Bolivian music producers.196 Important parts of the conversation 
include how intellectual property ought to refer to traditional 
knowledge, how to break down the binary between Western and 
traditional knowledge, and how to build digital archives that center the 
demands and traditions of the indigenous populations. The question of 
how to handle traditional knowledge is complex. It requires local 
considerations and nuance which necessitate considerable situated 
study. In many ways, the work that has been done is merely the tip of 
the iceberg, particularly given the vast disparities in the production of 
knowledge in different parts of the world. 
These conversations have also notably taken different forms in 
different areas of intellectual property. For instance, in the context of 
copyrights, the limited ability to protect jazz and hip hop,197 yoga,198 
and traditional design199 have come to the fore. The subject matter in 
each of those examples is different, though all require a copyright 
approach that is flexible enough to account for their particularities. In 
the context of trademarks, the issue is often the opposite; that is, the 
utilization of racist imagery as alleged source signifiers implicates race 
more broadly.200 In the context of patents, battles over biopiracy 
continue, in the form of disputes over the ownership of patented 
products such as neem oil and turmeric201 and access to 
pharmaceuticals.202 Conversations in these areas often revolve around 
the best methods for naming, protecting, and remaking traditional 
knowledge, particularly when it comes into conflict with maximalist 
intellectual property regimes. For example, some scholars argue that 
distinguishing between traditional knowledge and “real” knowledge 
creates a problematic binary between those who can and cannot create. 
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It does so by fundamentally placing traditional or “raw” knowledge in a 
hierarchy below that which is treated as refined or “cooked” 
knowledge.203 Others focus on the best mechanism for protecting 
traditional knowledge, include international human rights law.204 Still 
others focus on the remaking of intellectual property law, a legal and 
performative process we will turn to at the end of this piece.205 Taken 
together, these conflicts point to the inadequacies of conventional 
intellectual property law to protect all forms of knowledge, equally and 
with an eye toward restorative justice. 
3. The Public Domain 
Critical Race IP scholarship, like intellectual property scholarship 
generally, is concerned with the public domain. However, unlike their 
law and economics counterparts, Race IP Crits are concerned with the 
racial and social justice dimensions of the management of the public 
domain, especially in ways that refuse to recognize property rights in 
existing traditional knowledge and hinder access to knowledge. Recent 
cases such as Eldred v. Ashcroft206 and Golan v. Holder207 have 
extended the term and scope of intellectual property rights, posing 
considerable problems for marginalized groups, particularly with 
respect to A2K. Unsurprisingly, as per claims of the rise of information 
feudalism, such transfers of information often unfold along 
(neo)colonial axes, with the developing world paying the price for the 
privatization and increasing scope of copyright, patent, and trademark 
law.208 Intellectual property maximalism in copyright and patent results 
in a “shrinking” public domain by restricting access to knowledge along 
distinctly racial lines.209 James Boyle210 and Michael Brown211 offer in-
depth accounts of this process, while Sunder and Chander highlight the 
need to read the public domain as not simply the opposite of intellectual 
property but also as a space for (neo)colonial ownership claims to 
traditional knowledge.212 “The romance of the public domain” refers to 
the fetishistic desire to embrace the public domain as an alternative to 
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intellectual property maximalism without adequate consideration of its 
underlying inequalities.213 Meanwhile, as the expansion of trademark 
law threatened and threatens to make the brand all-powerful, both as a 
legal and cultural form, it too erodes equal access to the public domain, 
particularly for those who were racially stereotyped. Jane Gaines and 
Rosemary Coombe trace this process, demonstrating the increasing 
value and significance of ownership of the brand as well as resistance to 
that ownership, particularly when racial symbols are invoked.214 
As information feudalism has grown more intense in the 2000s, 
calls for equal access have become more commonplace. Chon, for 
instance, argues for wide access to educational materials,215 one which 
was borne out in the Delhi University copyright case in which the 
Indian Supreme Court determined that the policy interest in access to 
knowledge outweighed the monopoly afforded to publishers.216 In 
contexts such as access to copyrighted materials or access to 
pharmaceuticals, the public domain is not a universal concept but one 
that must be situationally redefined to account for the states of 
development and growth trajectories of nations in the Global South.217 
While we take up some of these examples in the sections that follow, 
we observe generally that the public domain is not an unqualified good, 
nor is its designation as the opposite of property without complications. 
It is instead a social construction which often erases intellectual 
property law’s protection of white supremacy and denies A2K to the 
world’s most vulnerable populations. The regulation of the public 
domain and the scope of its contents, therefore, remain important 
questions for scholars of race and intellectual property. 
4. Framing and Reframing “Piracy” and “Counterfeiting” 
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concept is a historically complicated one,218 in which infringers such as 
the United States became protectors of intellectual properties once they 
had the authority and the incentive to do so. Accordingly, attempts to 
label those in the developing world as “pirates” have been met with 
considerable conceptual and legal resistance. In particular, those in the 
developing world have pushed back against the overarching 
development narrative of intellectual property law, asserting the 
existence and import of local approaches to the protection of 
knowledge.219 Moreover, they have articulated alternative economic 
narratives, which reframe and even justify “Third World” infringement 
as necessary, beneficial, and unavoidable.220 For instance, Ravi 
Sundaram’s concept of the “pirate modernity,” which emerged through 
his study of the urban modernities in India, calls for recognition that the 
purportedly universal standards advanced by international intellectual 
property law do not even begin to describe the material conditions of 
existence in rapidly developing nations such as India.221 In Sundaram’s 
retelling of the story of the piracy, the urbanization of the city, as well 
as its technological development, are integral to understanding the role 
of infringement, and indeed its unavoidability, within contemporary 
Indian contexts.222 Liang tells a tale of Indian counterfeiters turned 
protectors of their intellectual properties, explaining that the progress of 
capitalism makes infringement necessary for many to survive.223 He 
identifies capitalism as a core reason for piracy and counterfeiting, 
discussing the ways its detritus results in left behind individuals who 
copy protected works of authorship and invention to survive.224 Liang’s 
work demonstrates the nuance of the developing world’s orientation 
toward knowledge production as well as how economic systems 
determine knowledge production structures. 
Sundaram and Liang offer examples of attempts to reframe those 
narratives of so-called piracy that originate in the Global North. They 
and others continue to complicate the critique Shiva initiated, refusing 
reductive stories of infringement as exclusively about economic loss to 
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Western nations. Studies of shanzhai in China,225 hip-hop in South 
Africa,226 and pharmaceuticals in Mexico and South and Central 
America227 ask us to reconsider accepted notions that piracy always 
flows from North to South. Discussions of cultural appropriation, 
particularly of traditional designs such as Navajo prints and adrinka and 
kente cloth, raise further questions about the nature of piracy.228 Along 
these lines, Kavita Philip’s work makes important claims about the 
social construction of the pirate figure, particularly by investigating how 
it is mobilized in the service of violence in contemporary politics.229 
We would be remiss, though, to suggest that framings of piracy—
or any of the other issues that we have identified here—are only 
contemporary concerns. Rather, practices of labeling racial Others as 
pirates can be traced to colonial notions that people of color were 
incapable of producing knowledge of value, a topic we take up further 
in Part IV of this article.230 Questions about the definitions and scope of 
infringement and counterfeiting are not exceptional ones. Rather, they 
are likely to increasingly frame Critical Race IP scholarship, 
particularly as developing countries engage arguments for maximalist 
intellectual property law in the context of opposing histories, narratives, 
and materialities. The characterization and construction of the figure of 
the pirate—and infringer more generally—will figure prominently into 
these discussions and the pushback against intellectual property 
regimes.  
5. Access to Knowledge 
An overarching question for race and intellectual property scholars 
is who receives access to innovations in intellectual property and at 
what cost. One early and ongoing battle in this area has revolved around 
pharmaceuticals. After the negotiation of TRIPS, which grants 
compulsory licenses for certain medications to developing countries,231 
India became—and continues to be—the “pharmacy to the developing 
world” due to its production of low cost generic drugs in large 
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quantities.232 The United States and India, however, quickly disagreed 
about the latter’s production of cheap drugs. As a result, India has spent 
many years on the United States’ Special 301 Priority Watch List and 
had a number of disputes with the US over pharmaceuticals, such as 
Novartis’ Glivec.233 Other nations, including South Africa and Mexico, 
have had similar conflicts with the United States. Much of the 
developing world maintains that the limited monopolies granted by 
patent law are not suitable for the vast majority of the world because 
they limit access to life-saving medications that can be used to treat 
HIV/AIDS and cancer.234 
While an important component of the A2K conversation, 
pharmaceutical access is simply one aspect of a larger problem. Issues 
of distributive justice and equal access to intellectual properties arise 
repeatedly in international contexts.235 Most recently, the Delhi 
University copyright case has been at the center of conversations about 
access to scholarship in the developing world. Taking on global fair use 
standards, the Indian Supreme Court refused to find copyright 
infringement when a copy shop made unlicensed copies of academic 
articles and books. India’s move highlights the continuing inability of 
those in the developing world to access many forms of knowledge, a 
problem that is compounded by the frequent refusal of the developed 
world to protect many types of traditional knowledge.236 Keith Aoki, 
Margaret Chon, and Ruth Okediji laid the groundwork for discussions 
of distributive justice within intellectual property law, centering 
questions of protectability of creative works and access to knowledge 
on people of color.237 As demonstrated in Sunder’s From Goods to the 
Good Life and Foster’s Reinventing Hoodia, these questions remain 
live.238 Human flourishing and equal benefit sharing are not yet issues 
that intellectual property law is capable of successfully engaging. We 
note, as well, that such problems are necessarily intertwined with those 
of personhood and property because they implicate the question of who 
is read as a full human being worthy of being saved. Moreover, 
important questions about how to achieve equal A2K, particularly in a 
system of racial capitalism, remain. Because the production and 
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circulation of intellectual properties often move along raced lines, it will 
be impossible to address such questions without considering the 
underlying racial structures of copyright, trademark, patent, right of 
publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition. Both remaking and 
moving beyond law and economics models of IP to engage A2K and 
distributive justice concerns are themes that remain and will remain 
central in the work of Race IP Crits. 
6. Remaking Intellectual Properties 
Developing nations have not readily accepted the landscape of 
intellectual property law offered to them by developed nations. Quite 
the contrary, race and intellectual property scholars have traced attempts 
by those in the developing world to contest international intellectual 
property regimes, including crafting licenses and exceptions to the 
TRIPS policies which apply to the developing world. Some of the 
scholarship we have already cited speaks to the desires and practices 
around creating new systems of intellectual property law which fully 
account for the knowledge created by people of color.239 Halbert traces 
some of these approaches in her book Resisting Intellectual Property.240 
Jane Anderson, Kathy Bowrey, Kimberly Christen, and Angela Riley,241 
among many others, have done considerable work in examining 
indigenous systems of ownership, highlighting possibilities for creating 
new licensing schemes, archival practices, and digital information 
management practices to extend protections to indigenous knowledge. 
Proposals around these ideas are not without their flaws nor are they 
completely settled. Rather, they are stepping stones for continuing to 
reimagine intellectual properties futures. We turn to the question of how 
one might reimagine intellectual property more fully in Part IV, in 
which we look at decolonial futures. Notably, while some, such as 
Sunder, wish to remake intellectual property through the reorientation 
of its values, investments, and goals, for instance by focusing on human 
flourishing.242 Others, such as Foster, suggest a need to dig deeper and 
unpack the (neo)colonial and capitalist underpinnings of law. 243 While 
engagements with remaking in intellectual properties vary in their 
pragmatism, all perspectives will be important in intellectual property’s 
remaking. 
A number of scholars have also undertaken consideration of the 
extent to which human rights regimes might be used to re-conceptualize 
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and remake intellectual property law. In particular, the possibilities for 
deploying definitions of folklore and cultural property in international 
human rights documents has been much discussed as a mechanism for 
expanding the scope of intellectual property rights regimes for the 
benefit of those in the developing world.244 However, just as with other 
solutions and interventions described here, it is unclear whether such 
solutions will be workable within current political constraints. The 
human rights approach is an example of a practical intervention into 
intellectual property law. Such practical interventions — Critical Race 
IP in action one might say — are an important aspect of the future of the 
interdisciplinary movement. Lateef Mtima conceived of the Intellectual 
Property Institute for Social Justice to call attention to issues such as 
those we describe here.245 Similarly, K.J. Greene has remained focused 
on the practical ways musicians might secure rights to their masters, 
including through reparations.246 Nonetheless, any and all spaces for 
remaking intellectual property, at individual or structural levels, remain 
important for not only making space within existing intellectual 
property regimes for the knowledge production of people of color but 
also envisioning new institutions, laws, and practices that do not simply 
accommodate Other knowledge but embrace it as entitled to protection. 
In Part IV, in contemplating decolonization, we engage the question of 
what it might mean to remake the fundamental assumptions not only of 
intellectual properties but the epistemological understandings of 
knowledge that undergird them. 
III. ALL WE HAVE IS EACH OTHER: COMMUNITY BUILDING AND PUBLIC 
FEELINGS IN CRITICAL RACE IP247 
 CRT and Critical Race IP are important tools not only for 
examining law’s tendencies to maintain white supremacy but also for 
engaging with, mobilizing, and shaping public feelings—including 
depression, fear, anxiety, love, and especially intimacy248—upon which 
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the positive and negative communal connections are built. We are 
concerned with how public feelings facilitate community building and 
make both CRT and Critical Race IP possible and effective as academic 
and activist endeavors. As Crenshaw et al. write: 
[I]t would be remiss for us to leave the impression that CRT . . . 
developed as a disembodied, abstracted, and autonomous intellectual 
formation. . . . [T]his view of scholarship obscures the shared 
difficulty that insurgent scholars must negotiate and the importance 
of developing collective strategies to write about racial power from 
within the institutions central to its reproduction. A thorough 
mapping of Critical Race Theory, then, must include a discussion of 
the role of community-building among the intellectuals who are 
associated with it . . . .
249
 
Community building, as it unfolds in the context of CRT, involves 
connection and collectivity, trust and vulnerability. It is a practice which 
involves forming bonds with individuals, namely academics and 
activists, through the remaking of histories, telling of stories, and 
mentoring of young scholars.250 By bringing individuals together around 
the goal of anti-racist activism, CRT creates “public intimacy,”251 in 
Berlant’s terms, facilitating the circulation of shared narratives and the 
creation of spaces of familiarity, comfort, and safety. Intimacy, as we 
use it here, describes a quality of closeness, a shared public feeling 
which binds Race Crits together in a group, a community around the 
goal of anti-racist activism, particularly in legal spaces. In this section, 
we focus on both community building and public feelings of intimacy to 
stress the emotional components of CRT. Put differently, while all 
intimacy evokes a sense of community and closeness, even if with only 
one other person, not all communities are bound together by intimacy. 
CRT and Critical Race IP function best when they involve both strong 
public feelings of intimacy and practices of community building. We 
therefore attend to CRT and Critical Race IP as involving both formal 
practices of community building and emotional practices of intimacy 
making. Without intimacy, as Crenshaw et al. suggest, anti-racist 
activism fails, because “insurgent scholars” lack the base from which to 
speak truth to power. In spaces of connection, both CRT and Critical 
Race IP thrive and flourish.  
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Before turning to the ways CRT and Critical Race IP involve both 
community building and intimacy, we find it useful to contextualize the 
term intimacy, by way of work on public feelings, emotions, and affect. 
In the section entitled “Structures of Feeling” in his 1977 book Marxism 
and Literature, Raymond Williams writes: 
Such changes can be defined as changes in structures of feeling. . . . 
‘[F]eeling’ is chosen to emphasize a distinction from more formal 
concepts of ‘world-view’ or ‘ideology.’ It is not only that we must go 
beyond formally held and systematic beliefs . . . . It is that we are 
concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and 
felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs 
are in practice variable . . . over a range from formal assent with 
private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between selected and 
interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences.
252
 
In recent years, an affective turn in the academy has encouraged 
the study not only of, in Williams’ parlance, structures of feeling and 
emotion, but also affect itself.253 The affective turn, of course, is not 
new.254 It is the resurrection and reanimation of the work of scholars of 
color, often black feminists and queer scholars, including Audre Lorde 
and bell hooks, who have explicitly and implicitly focused on emotional 
networks as fundamental to the survival of marginalized 
communities.255 Affect is largely a neurobiological term used to 
describe precognitive intensities, one which some use to trace social and 
cultural practices.256 In contrast, the term public feelings, which we use 
interchangeably with emotions, describes those named affective 
experiences which are named and circulated in public discourse and 
shared across bodies.257 These definitions, however, are best read as 
“points of departure for discussion rather than definition,”258 starting 
points for thinking about how community building practices work in 
tandem with public feelings in the contexts of CRT, including its 
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interdisciplinary offshoots, and Critical Race IP. Sara Ahmed explains 
the central inquiry of public feelings: 
How do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and 
against other others? How do emotions move between bodies? . . . 
[E]motions play a crucial role in the ‘surfacing’ of individual and 
collective bodies through the way in which emotions circulate 
between bodies and signs. Such an argument clearly challenges any 
assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply 
belong to individuals, or even that they come from within and then 
move outward toward others.
259
 
Ahmed thinks about public feelings as transmitted between 
individuals, in ways which can be theorized and interpreted. In her 
formulation, representational practices are not simply logically 
instructive but also emotionally so. The passion of public feeling creates 
bonds between individuals and ultimately collective identities, even 
though such feelings do not reside within individuals per se. Ahmed 
continues, “[i]n such affective economies, emotions do things, and they 
align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social 
space—through the very intensity of their attachments.”260 Per Williams 
and Ahmed, it is possible to trace and theorize the movement of public 
feelings across social spaces and between individuals. One such space 
in which public feelings move is in and through legal structures and 
among those negotiating them in their everyday lives. 
The affective turn has manifested in legal scholarship as well as 
the academy at large.261 As scholars have turned to studying the role of 
emotion in contexts such as remorse in sentencing,262 vigilante 
justice,263 and the death penalty,264 the connections between law and 
structures of feeling have become increasingly clear. Studies of feeling 
predate the affective turn and were perhaps the inevitable outcome of 
intersectional feminist urgings to make the personal political.265 Indeed, 
in many ways, the central struggle of racial justice in the United States, 
from Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to Black Lives Matter, could be 
articulated as one centered on moving public feelings, through interest 
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convergence or moral suasion.266 In the tradition of scholarship engaged 
with public feelings, this section reads CRT and Critical Race IP as 
fundamentally intimate anti-racist projects, which thrive through the 
constitution of community, connection, and mutual investment. 
Understanding CRT and Critical Race IP as engaged in the work of 
public feelings— including racial feelings—is helpful in considering 
how both have evolved and continue to evolve. It also provides insight 
into structural and material necessities for developing Critical Race IP.  
A. CRT as intimate practice 
As Berlant describes, intimacy is a worldmaking enterprise, one 
through which individuals build space for connection through shared 
stories, feelings, and vulnerabilities.267 Moreover, intimacy need not be 
only between persons in romantic, friendly, or familial relationships, it 
is a feeling which can be negotiated in a variety of contexts, including 
jurisprudential ones.268 Indeed, Berlant goes on to explain that, for 
Jurgen Habermas, intimacy is a vital part of democratic engagement, 
specifically “the notion of the democratic public sphere thus made 
collective intimacy a public and social ideal, one of fundamental 
political interest.”269 The notion of collective intimacy is a helpful one 
for thinking about radical practices within legal spaces, particularly 
CRT. For instance, in “The Word and the River: Pedagogy as 
Scholarship as Struggle,” Charles R. Lawrence III writes: 
I feel an immediate kinship with the tradition that [Vincent] Harding 
describes and names ‘the Word.’ It is a tradition of teaching, 
preaching, and healing; an interdisciplinary tradition wherein healers 
are concerned with the soul and preachers with the pedagogy of the 
oppressed; a tradition that eschews hierarchy in the face of the need 
for all of us who seek liberation to be both teachers and students.
270
 
The Word, Lawrence reminds us, is “a unifying force, a statement 
of protest, an expression of courage, an organizing tool, the articulation 
of utopian dreams or a higher law . . . .”271 It also requires space for 
feeling and experience, in a manner that calls upon African traditions as 
models for passing on information to future generations through modes 
such as storytelling and oral historical tradition.272 
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Lawrence’s framing of the Word is thematically similar to the way 
that other Race Crits talk about CRT as practice of storytelling,273 
finding voice,274 and undoing the perception of racial non-neutrality in 
the law.275 Each of these practices is deeply interconnected with the 
circulation of public feelings about law, legal pedagogy, race, and social 
justice. Even reading foundational CRT texts suggests the community 
building and intimacy making that was interwoven into the history of 
the movement. From stories of the original CRT workshops to the 
familiarity with which scholars in the area refer to one another, making 
visible the non-racial neutrality of law has always been the practice of 
cultivating public feelings between comrades, establishing relationships 
between Race Crits, and making space for radical legal practice. 
Berlant’s language is useful in reading Lawrence’s: he describes a 
process creating shared (counter)stories, ones which center marginalized 
experiences. In his piece, teaching and learning operate as practices of 
building community and intimacy between individuals who might 
otherwise not find a place in the legal academy. CRT is, therefore, as 
much about building a space for connection between individuals, i.e., 
doing the world-making work of racial justice, as it is about unseating 
dominant ideologies in law about race. Indeed, the latter process, which 
involves understanding CRT as a praxis of radical racial justice in the 
world, necessarily meant activist-scholars working together on legal 
matters.276 Naming the processes of community building through 
intimacy making is a productive exercise, one that makes visible some 
of the practices through which CRT not only critiqued the law’s 
insistence on its purported racial neutrality but also effectively 
constructed networks, relationships, and spaces in which people of color 
could thrive in and through law, in the face of white supremacy. 
Perhaps no methodological commitment of CRT illustrates better 
the process of community building and intimacy making than 
storytelling. Deeply tied to CRT’s investments in anti-racist activism 
and centering marginalized voices, storytelling operated as a vehicle for 
making space for equality. In Faces at the Bottom of the Well and The 
Rodrigo Chronicles, two landmark CRT texts, Derrick Bell and Richard 
Delgado adopt a storytelling style, using fiction and narrative to weave 
parables about race and law.277 Their generic choices themselves – 
specifically moves to create protagonists who move through legal 
institutions and tell stories about the law using a set of epistemological 
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assumptions that are not defaults of the legal system – are in a form that 
is as much about the intimacies of law as it is about law’s technicalities. 
“The Space Traders,” one of the most memorable chapters of Faces at 
the Bottom of the Well, tells an evocative science fiction tale which 
traces the negotiations that might unfold in a world in which aliens 
promised to fix all of America’s problems in exchange for the nation’s 
black population.278 While initially the tale might provoke incredulous 
reactions, it quickly becomes hauntingly real, an accessible and realistic 
portrayal of the United States’ continual failure to secure racial justice 
for black people. Stories such as this follow an introduction which 
reminds us that race and law in America are fundamentally emotional 
and personal experiences, ones which are prominent in public feelings. 
Bell writes: “When I was growing up in the years before the Second 
World War, our slave heritage was more a symbol of shame than a 
source of pride. It burdened black people with an indelible mark of 
difference as we struggled to be like whites.”279 Bell speaks not only of 
the public feelings around the laws which institutionalized racism but 
also the collective experience of blackness in America, the inherent 
connectedness of those emotions and their relationship to community 
and growing up with slaves as ancestors. By articulating the public 
feelings associated with his experience, Bell forces us to feel law, not 
simply think it. 
The Rodrigo Chronicles similarly explores emotions, by narrating 
a series of dialogic conversations between “Professor” and Rodrigo, a 
person of color in law school. After the book’s publication, Delgado 
wrote “Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle,” subtitled, = “Empathy and False 
Empathy,” which he begins: “I was sitting in my darkened office one 
afternoon, thinking about my life. To tell the truth, I was missing 
Rodrigo. Not long ago, I had consigned him to the Great Beyond. But 
now I was flooded with regret and sadness. I missed his brashness, his 
insouciant originality. Odd, I had not thought of myself as 
sentimental.”280 Delgado speaks of the emotions of the fictional law 
professor, emphasizing the bond between him and his former student. 
The passage is notable not only because of its description of the 
emotional bond between Rodrigo and his former professor but because 
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Delgado focuses on them in a law review article. He speaks of the 
community building and intimacy making that happens in law schools, 
particularly around questions of race and identity. The Rodrigo 
Chronicles highlights through storytelling the process through which 
mentor and student develop intimacy and come together in common 
purpose, in a manner that is connected and transformative. 
Storytelling, of course, is not significant because it is a new 
practice but because of the way it brings to light structural inequalities 
and identity based discrimination that is otherwise erased from view. 
Moreover, storytelling, through its resonance with individual 
experience, is an effective means of mobilizing action in the service of 
racial justice. Crenshaw’s groundbreaking “Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color,” makes explicit the role of community building and intimacy in 
the struggle to end violence against women of color. She writes, 
presaging Berlant, “[t]his process of recognizing as social and systemic 
what was formerly perceived as isolated and individual has also 
characterized the identity politics of African Americans, other people of 
color, and gays and lesbians, among others. For all these groups, 
identity-based politics has been a source of strength, community, and 
intellectual development.”281 CRT, as mechanism for navigating the 
relationship between law and race, is rooted in the need to make public 
those experiences which often unfold in private and highlight the racism 
which is rendered institutionally invisible. Therefore, to think CRT is, 
necessarily, to think community building and intimacy and to move 
individuals to intervene in oppressive systems. It is to think about 
strategies for activism in a fundamentally anti-black and anti-people of 
color justice system, it is to think about surviving together in the face of 
oppression, it is to think about creating spaces for coping with 
inequality, and it is to think about the connection required to sustainably 
resist violence against people of color. With CRT’s approach to 
community building and intimacy as a model, we turn to a discussion of 
community building and intimacy in intellectual property law and 
intellectual properties generally, as well as the relevance of both in 
forming a cohesive area of study around Critical Race IP. 
B. Critical Race IP as community building and intimacy making 
In the quote at the beginning of this Article, Claudia Rankine and 
Beth Loffreda remind us that creative works are always already about 
race.282 We are, as individuals, inescapably chained to “race and its 
infiltrations” in ways which manifest in the creation, reception, and 
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circulation of creative works. How individuals make, interpret, and 
share creative works is fundamentally affected by their identities, in 
ways which are not always apparent or even conscious. The problem of 
“race and its infiltrations,” as we discussed earlier, is not one which is 
confined to copyright law. Rather, trademark law and patent law are 
also fundamentally raced enterprises. Moreover, intellectual 
properties—including, for instance, books like The Wind Done Gone, 
bands like the Slants, and the protection of turmeric for wound 
healing—are part of the fabric of everyday life, they are objects through 
which public feelings about race are created, transmitted, and 
negotiated. In other words, intellectual properties are deeply linked not 
only to identity but also to public feelings about identity. Intellectual 
property works, as Minh-Ha Pham puts it in the context of copyright, 
“not as a system that simply controls and regulates the circulation of 
creative works but more fundamentally as a system that provides 
institutional infrastructure for privileging some emotional expressions 
and occluding others.”283 Through intellectual properties, “[b]odies can 
catch feelings as easily as catch fire: affect leaps from one body to 
another.”284 
Communities also come together to respond to intellectual 
properties which mobilize public feelings. Returning to the examples 
above, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin285 moved African American 
literary scholars to respond to attempts to erase Alice Randall’s tale of 
Scarlett O’Hara’s half black sister.286 Matal v. Tam prompted Asian 
American and Native American activists to question the choice to 
trademark a name that for many still operates as a racial slur.287 The 
grant of patent protection of turmeric for wound healing sparked 
outrage among Indian and Indian American communities, resulting a 
political movement against biopiracy. Such responses demonstrate the 
potential for intellectual properties to prompt the spontaneous and short 
lived or long lasting formation of communities that counter their 
provocations of public feelings. We further argue that, as in the case of 
CRT, communities of those who are interested in racial justice in the 
context of intellectual properties have the potential to form long lasting 
connections, with shared intimacy, around Critical Race IP. 
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Race + IP 2017 was an opportunity for scholars with an interest in 
race and intellectual property to join together in conversations about the 
topic. The conference, which over 60 individuals attended, brought 
together an eclectic mix of individuals from across disciplines, 
including law, communication, Ethnic Studies, anthropology, and Black 
Studies. During the event, scholars and activists commented on the 
public feelings the conference elicited, from excitement about the 
speakers in attendance to anticipation for that which might come next. 
Talks about particular icons of intellectual property—Prince, Clyde 
Stubblefield, the Cadillac—evoked sentiments of pride, sadness, 
nostalgia, and anger. The end of the conference, punctuated by a talk by 
Simon Tam and as well as an impromptu dance party to the music of the 
Slants, brought scholars together in a thoughtful and festive manner 
which, while unconventional for most academic events was perhaps 
appropriate for a race and intellectual property conference. The point we 
are trying to make here is that the project of Critical Race IP is one 
which is organically disposed to both community building and intimacy 
making. Gathering to speak about topics around race, intellectual 
properties, and social justice naturally lends itself to affective 
connectedness and public feelings of excitement, frustration, anger, 
hope, and intimacy which move among bodies. Moreover, recognizing 
such public feelings and the relationship to the creation of communities 
around race and activism is in keeping with the tradition of CRT. 
The tendency of Critical Race IP to elicit and traffic in public 
feelings which aid in the creation of community and intimacy is helpful 
in contemplating the contours of the material structures which might 
facilitate the growth of the area of study. Events which both recognize 
and center the affective qualities of intellectual properties in a manner 
that facilitates community building around racial justice are productive 
ones for building Critical Race IP. In the context of CRT, community 
building and intimacy making unfolded at workshops, LatCrit 
conferences, and through an informal network of scholars committed to 
mentoring those who wished to join the legal academy. We propose that 
the future of Critical Race IP involves similar material interventions, 
which create space for continued discussion of the intersections between 
race and intellectual properties. Moreover, because Critical Race IP is 
so intertwined with CRT, considering some of the central questions that 
Race Crits have grappled with may be helpful in articulating the 
boundaries and materialities of the incipient field. 
For instance, like LatCrit, Critical Race IP would benefit from 
embracing the “shifting bottoms” and “rotating centers” models upon 
which Athena Mutua elaborates.288 Mutua asked with respect to the 
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black/white binary in CRT: “What group should be at the center of a 
given study or enterprise?” “Whose faces are at the bottom of the well?” 
and “What model should we use to analyze a given paradigm?”289 
Though these questions do not precisely port over to our discussion of 
Critical Race IP, Mutua’s answer to them, which argues for the need to 
center multiple groups from “the bottom,” resonates with Critical Race 
IP’s diverse, transnational themes and investments. She writes, “The 
key to the ‘bottom’ metaphor is that the ‘bottom’ is constructed by the 
particularities of ‘white power’s’ . . . obsessions, which result in the 
creation of different racial categories and systems.”290 Race IP Crits 
might consider how whiteness orients the field of intellectual property 
and where future research might best unfold. Moreover, as Mutua 
contends, coalition building is a worthy goal for Race IP Crits. 
Considering how to reconcile the diverse histories of the “shifting 
bottoms” as a means for creating “rotating centers” may be helpful in 
articulating how to conceptualize future events and scholarly works. 
While we have proposed provisional themes here, we only offer an 
opening salvo, one, which we hope that Race IP Crits will take up in 
productive ways. The questions of who might be at the center of Critical 
Race IP, if the area of study indeed has a center, whose faces are at the 
bottom of the intellectual property well, and what models should be 
used to analyze given paradigms are certainly open ones. For the time 
being, cultivating the ideals of community building and intimacy within 
the context of Critical Race IP may be a sufficient starting point for 
answering those questions as well as new and developing ones. 
IV. CRITICAL RACE IP AS DECOLONIZING PRAXIS 
In the historic piece “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,” Derrick Bell, Jr. 
observes that “Leroy Clark has written that the black community’s 
belief in the efficacy of litigation inhibited the development of 
techniques involving popular participation and control, that might have 
advanced school desegregation in the South.”291 Bell, who echoes the 
criticism of Civil Rights Movement leaders such as Dr. King, goes on to 
observe that “[t]he problem of unjust laws . . . is almost invariably a 
problem of distribution of political and economic power.”292 If we 
accept Bell’s principle as true, then it is necessary to find productive 
 
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999); see also Matsuda, supra note 106; cf. 
FACES, supra note 186. 
289
See Mutua, supra note 288, at 1177–78. 
290
Id. at 1180.  
291
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 514 (1976). 
292
Id.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898 
KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2018  6:00 PM 
788 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 36:3 
extra-legal as well as legal approaches to anti-racist and anti-colonial 
resistance within the context of intellectual properties, ones which are 
not invested in conservative law and economics models. Following 
Bell’s lead and his conceptualization of racial realism,293 we offer as 
one avenue for locating such radical approaches: decolonial theory. 
Addressing the structural sources of the unequal distribution of political 
and economic power that Bell raises as a primary cause of racial non-
neutrality in law is a central goal of decolonial theory and practice, 
which have become increasingly central to anti-racist and anti-colonial 
strategy among academics and activists. While we do not mean to 
suggest that decolonial theory is the one right answer to reworking race 
and intellectual property, we maintain that its understanding of the 
nexus of (neo)coloniality, narratives of progress, power, and knowledge 
is a useful one to deploy to undo intellectual property’s racial and 
(neo)colonial logics. Moreover, decolonial theory can be thought 
together with other types of critical theory, including CRT, feminism, 
and queer theory in order to imagine new ways of creating radical 
multiversalities. As such, it creates space for a complex and 
multifaceted engagement with race, (neo)coloniality and intellectual 
property that addresses the fundamental historical power dynamics that 
shaped laws of knowledge production. In short, it is only through the 
death of the (European/American) human294 that Others can claim their 
place as radical equal partners in humanity.295 
Decoloniality, as Walter Mignolo describes it, addresses the 
“hidden agenda” of modernity, 296 namely an investment in coloniality. 
For him, coloniality “names the underlying logic of the foundation and 
unfolding of Western civilization from the Renaissance to today of 
which historical colonialisms have been a constitutive, though 
downplayed, dimension.”297 Darrel Wanzer-Serrano describes 
decoloniality’s centrality in creating systems of power which embrace 
Otherness, writing “[d]ecoloniality is an alternative accent – one 
marked by pluriversal commitments, geohistorical attentiveness, and 
biographical configurations.”298 As such, the “coloniality” in 
decoloniality does not simply describe the process and reparation of 
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colonization, it describes the logics of progress, enlightenment, 
development, and democracy which made the domination of Other 
peoples, in its many racist and (neo)colonial manifestations, a thinkable 
option. Modernity and coloniality are, therefore, fundamentally 
intertwined, with the former often offering ideological and narrative 
justifications for the latter. Per Anibal Quijano, (neo)coloniality 
operates through a “matrix of power”299 with four component parts: 
economic control, authority, patriarchal domination, and knowledge and 
subjectivity.300 Quijano explains the scope of coloniality, as well as its 
tendency to permeate other forms of oppression: 
In the beginning colonialism was a product of a systematic 
repression, not only of the specific beliefs, ideas, images, symbols or 
knowledge that were not useful to global colonial domination, while 
at the same time the colonizers were expropriating from the 
colonized their knowledge . . . as well as their products and work. 
The repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of 
producing knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and 
systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over the 
resources, patterns, and instruments of formalized and objectivised 
[sic] expression, intellectual or visual. It was followed by the 
imposition of the use of the rulers’ own patterns of expression, and 
of their beliefs and images with reference to the supernatural. These 
beliefs and images served not only to impede the cultural production 
of the dominated, but also as a very efficient means of social and 




For Quijano, the colonization of power was the underlying impetus 
for the creation of the category of race, the original move which made 
all other forms of domination possible.302 Moreover, colonization’s 
objectification of the colonized, i.e. rendering them the objects of study 
instead of producers of knowledge, conceptually voids the idea of Other 
knowledge.303 The four categories of the colonial matrix that Quijano 
identifies articulate areas in which colonizers exercised their power to 
effect total control over the colonized and their knowledge. 
Decolonization, therefore, requires a “de-linking” from the 
colonial matrix of power and its ideological commitments to modernity, 
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with all its component parts.304 Put differently, decolonial theory and 
praxis conceives of “epistemological reconstitution,”305 which makes 
space for “another rationality which may legitimately pretend to some 
universality.”306 Wanzer-Serrano defines decoloniality as: 
[A]ny practice, discursive or otherwise, that facilitates a divestment 
from modernity/coloniality and invents openings through which 
decolonial epistemics can emerge. . . . Delinking requires changes in 
both content and form . . . . It requires being oriented toward shifts in 
our genealogies of thought, including drawing authority from 
colonized spaces/voices and resisting latent imperialisms—even 
when such resistance may not be exclusively oppositional.
307
 
Decoloniality is also distinct from dewesternization, a practice 
which attempts to create radical multiversality through the already 
existing frameworks of global governance and neoliberal capitalism.308 
We are skeptical that dewesternization, as Mignolo defines it, can play 
any role in undoing intellectual property’s valorization of economic 
productivity, investment, and profit, or its deep and entrenched fidelity 
to racial capitalism. The post-Lochner and post-Fordist world imagines 
creatorship as labor performed in the service of national economic 
survival. Consequently, we imagine the decolonial as the radical 
departure from law and economics and racial capitalism as well as 
racism and (neo)colonialism. That is not to say that incrementalism is 
unimportant in moving toward a decolonized world; rather that the 
struggle for social justice in intellectual property law appears to 
necessitate undoing and remaking economic models that fuel racial 
capitalism.  
In this section, then, we situate decoloniality as a practice which 
can be used to unmake intellectual property’s investments in whiteness 
and racial capitalism, particularly because of its overarching 
engagement with the underlying epistemologies of knowledge 
production and its transnational scope. We first define coloniality, a 
practice which is both historical and contemporary, with reference to 
decolonial understandings of the term and then examine how 
decoloniality might be used to think through intellectual property’s 
“possessive investment in whiteness.”309 In doing so, we offer 
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decoloniality as an avenue for theoretical and practical exploration vis-
à-vis intellectual properties. As we show, spaces of knowledge 
production that break with the demands of coloniality already exist, and 
we model what may come next.310 
Coloniality, as formulated by Mignolo and Quijano, implicitly 
includes intellectual property regimes, which incorporate core principles 
of modernity into their frameworks for governing property ownership. 
Whether understood through the history of devaluing the knowledge of 
racial Others, including slaves and indigenous peoples, the imposition 
of predominantly European intellectual property rights regimes on the 
developing world, the commodification of traditional knowledge, or the 
implicit imposition of development agendas on the regulation of 
knowledge production, intellectual property law reinforces the central 
premises of modernity and beliefs in the inequality of people of color 
that underlie them. Because intellectual property law is deeply 
embedded within and committed to reproducing modernity/coloniality, 
legal reform without undoing its fundamentally European values is 
unlikely to succeed in creating more racially just information 
paradigms.311 Put differently, decolonizing intellectual property is a 
necessary prerequisite to undoing the racial hierarchies that are 
embedded within the law itself. While this does not mean that we 
should abandon attempts at legal reform, it does mean grappling with 
the underlying power dynamics through which intellectual property 
regimes were and continue to be produced. Read as such, 
decolonization is a complementary project to CRT, one that looks 
beyond even the ideologies which inform law’s racial non-neutrality. 
Decolonial thinking might therefore be read as overlapping with CRT 
but with a broad commitment to undoing the damage of 
modernity/coloniality on the world, including its structures for 
information economies. 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres uses the framework of decoloniality to 
construct a framework for not simply anti-(neo)colonial resistance but 
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also anti-racist thinking. Following W.E.B. DuBois and Sylvia Wynter, 
he argues for the centrality of modernity/coloniality in the construction 
of racist regimes. For him, as with Fanon, “[d]ecolonization is about the 
creation of a new symbolic and material order that takes the full 
spectrum of human history, its achievements, and its failures, into 
view.”312 Yet the path of decolonization is not shaped around 
“overcoming” Empire or (neo)colonization as Fanon intimates.313 It is 
constructed through radical departure from the logics of modernity. 
Maldonado-Torres continues: 
Taking Du Bois and Wynter’s lead, I would like to suggest that from 
the perspectives of the repeatedly racialized groups of modernity, 
particularly indigenous people and people of African or Afro-mixed 
ex-slave descent, but also Jews and Muslims, a concept of Being 
premised on what is often referred to as the dialectics of modernity 
and the nation, and their supposed overcoming by the emergence of 
imperial sovereignty or Empire, miss the non-dialectical character of 
damnation. That is, in short, that what are changes for many, for 
those whom Frantz Fanon called the condemned of the earth seem 




Here, the decolonial is about creating something beyond the dialectic of 
modernity and coloniality, a framework that can radically embrace and 
center Otherness. His work is instructive here, as it offers us space for 
conceiving of how the decolonial accesses the problems of racism and 
(neo)coloniality in structures of knowledge production. In the remainder 
of the section, we unpack how delinking might look, as a set of 
scholarly and activist perspectives, guided by an ethic of decolonial 
love, that reorients us toward hearing the voices of the Global South so 
that we might begin disrupting what we know and how we come to 
know those things, but not necessarily in ways that are accountable or 
attempt to answer to the West.315 
Anderson, who spoke on this at Race + IP 2017, dreams of “de-
colonial futures” in the context of intellectual property law.316 While she 
predominantly focuses on indigenous knowledge, her work asks us to 
consider how and why decolonial theory might inform attempts to 
reimagine intellectual property law. For Anderson, decolonizing 
indigenous knowledge, at least in part, includes the creation of a new 
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system of labels and licenses whereby indigenous peoples have control 
over how information and objects are managed.317 One functional 
outcome of such licensing projects—as well as the attendant pushes to 
leverage human rights as a means of protecting traditional 
knowledge318—is to revalue knowledge that has been consistently 
marginalized, in part by highlighting the right of its creators to dictate 
how and when it is used. Scholars such as Boateng and Basole also 
examine ways of addressing the devaluation of traditional knowledge. 
Both scholars suggest even the terms “traditional knowledge” and 
“indigenous knowledge” are problematic because they create categories 
of information within intellectual property regimes.319 Identifying 
traditional knowledge or indigenous knowledge frequently involves 
differentiating it from information produced in Western contexts in 
ways which are legible to international intellectually property regimes. 
However, as Okediji and Coombe point out, such intellectual property 
regimes were built on a foundation of coloniality which refused to 
categorize information produced by the colonized as knowledge.320 
These critiques operate as delinking moves, which question the 
narratives that modernity has laid out for non-European knowledge. 
They also exemplify the type of critical practice that might aid in 
reimagining intellectual property law,. 
Delinking decoloniality in the context of intellectual property 
requires the rejection of narratives which categorize Other knowledge as 
secondary or inferior to that of Westerners, whether implicitly or 
explicitly. Terms such as “traditional knowledge,” “indigenous 
knowledge,” and “folklore” are dangerous precisely because they create 
a bifurcation between that knowledge produced informally, often by 
non-Westerners, and “real” knowledge. Resisting such narratives, for 
instance by advancing narratives of bio-piratical theft from the non-
Western world and reclaiming memories that might otherwise be erased 
from the canon, are important first steps in remaking the laws of 
information. The step, which follows pulling back the curtain on the 
implications of the modernity/coloniality binary for intellectual property 
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law, however, is a more complicated one. Decolonization requires 
reconstituting universality in a manner, which, instead of substituting 
the European for the totality, creates space for the embrace of multiple 
perspectives, in a manner, which is both democratic and cosmopolitan. 
While we do not offer a model to supplant that of modernity/coloniality, 
we note that several nations, such as India,321 Ghana,322 and South 
Africa,323 are remaking intellectual properties through the embrace of 
digital databases, local models of intellectual property protection, and 
rejection of international intellectual property regimes. Moreover, 
decolonizing practices can unfold at the individual level as well, 
through resistive performative practices, such as discursive 
interventions and arts. Our goal in highlighting both the undoing of 
narratives of modernity/coloniality in intellectual property and practices 
which supplant Western intellectual property law is to point to further 
avenues of research for Critical Race IP scholars. Existing scholarship 
in these areas suggests that attending to decoloniality as a means of 
interrogating the intersections of race and intellectual property is likely 
to be a fruitful avenue for further research. 
CONCLUSION 
This article endeavors to name and provisionally map the field of 
Critical Race IP, an area of study which describes that scholarship 
concerned with the intersections of race and intellectual property law. In 
doing so, it situates Critical Race IP in a larger socio-cultural context, in 
which racial capitalism is a constant but evolving feature of the 
historical landscape. We contend that the emergence of the Information 
Economy, after the era of Fordism, resulted in a repackaging of familiar 
racial projects in and through intellectual properties and pushes for 
intellectual property maximalism. Critical Race IP represents a 
relatively new and rapidly growing direction in CRT scholarship, it is 
an exemplar of the ways the latter must constantly evolve to 
accommodate changing economic and cultural conditions and racial 
formations. In articulating Critical Race IP as an area of study, our goal 
is not necessarily to suggest particular methodologies or even fixed 
unifying questions that define the interdisciplinary movement. Rather, 
we are concerned with naming and describing prevalent themes and 
core tenets in a set of scholarly works that interrogate the inequalities 
which emerge at the intersections of intellectual property and 
intersectional racial identities. We hope that project can be a generative 
move for scholars who wish to research, write, and practice in this area.  
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In setting forth a history of post-Fordism and the rise of Critical 
Race IP, we show that, as a product of modernity/coloniality, 
intellectual property law is always already invested in whiteness and 
racial inequality in ways which necessitate both examination and 
undoing. Scholars in a variety of disciplines have started to undertake 
such examinations, with their works engaging a set of themes which we 
have highlighted here. Continuing to examine questions related to 
defining (intellectual) property, understanding intellectual property’s 
stories, the public domain, framing and reframing “piracy” and 
“counterfeiting,” distributive justice, access to knowledge, managing 
traditional knowledge, and contemplating intellectual properties is an 
important task, one which we urge scholars to continue to take up in 
new and innovative ways. We also highlight the significance of personal 
relationships and public feelings in developing this area of study. One 
way to facilitate dialogue and scholarship in Critical Race IP is to invest 
in community building and intimacy making, cornerstones of the 
growth and development of CRT, both of which play a valuable role in 
cultivating generative interpersonal connections and structures of 
feeling through which new ideas can flourish. Conferences and 
workshops as well as collaborative projects which bring together senior 
and junior scholars play a significant role in cultivating and retaining 
Critical Race IP scholars. Finally, in concluding with a discussion of the 
decolonial turn, we offer a framework for moving beyond the radically 
unequal systems  produced from the vantage point of law and 
economics, which has been historically complicit in intellectual 
property law’s theoretical and practical centering of whiteness. 
Decolonization, a process that began to unfold after World War II, is 
not only a physical process but an epistemological one, which requires 
addressing intellectual property’s embeddedness within practices and 
ideologies of modernity/coloniality as well as the connections between 
the latter and racism and neocolonialism. Here, we offer decolonization 
as a means of beginning to contemplate the remaking of intellectual 
property law, in ways that not only radically embrace Otherness but 
make space for non-European ways of thinking, making, and owning 
knowledge. As we imagine it, Critical Race IP is a space for creating 
models for the politics of reparation—not simply equal rights or 
distributive justice—through which oppressed groups can heal the 
wounds of racism and colonialism. 
